



Taming the Wild West of Arbitration Ethics 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In arbitration’s perceived “anything goes” atmosphere, increasing 
concerns arise regarding ethical conduct within the forum.  This concern 
is particularly valid given the extraordinarily limited review available 
after an arbitrator renders an award.1  Although a number of scholars 
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 1. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a district court can vacate an award in any of the 
following limited circumstances: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
The Uniform Arbitration Act—adopted by the vast majority of states—similarly allows for vacatur 
in the following events: 
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in 
any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the right of any party; 
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown 
therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted 
the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights 
of a party; or 
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in 
proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing 
without raising the objection; but the fact that relief was such that it could not or would 
not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to 
confirm the award. 
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have commented on arbitrator misconduct,2 the literature is surprisingly 
devoid of commentary on the issue of attorney misconduct in the arbitral 
forum.  In fact, codes of conduct for arbitrators have existed since the 
1970s,3 but no similar standards have ever existed for arbitration 
participants.4  Attorney misconduct in the arbitral forum is an especially 
deep quagmire given the potential inapplicability of criminal penalties 
and sanctions commonly used in litigation to ensure that the attorneys act 
ethically, the witnesses testify truthfully, and the proper evidence 
remains available.5 
                                                                                                                       
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12(a) (1956). 
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act—adopted by a handful of states—provides a similar, but 
expanded, set of review provisions, including the review for “corruption, fraud, or other undue 
means.”  REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a) (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law?  The “Manifest Disregard of 
the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court should affirm 
“manifest disregard” as a ground for vacatur in the United States); Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration 
Law: Who’s In Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147 (2010) (arguing that recent Supreme Court 
precedent, which limited judicial review of arbitration awards, undermines the statutory protections 
of the FAA); Neal R. Troum, Another View of Rent-A-Center, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Who is 
Watching the Watchmen?, 28 ALTS. TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 184, 184–85 (2010) (discussing 
lack of oversight for arbitrators); Darren P. Lindamood, Comment, Redressing the Arbitration 
Process: An Alternative to the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291 
(2010) (arguing that arbitration reform should principally address and provide meaningful judicial 
review); Sara Roitman, Note, Beyond Reproach: Has the Doctrine of Arbitral Immunity Been 
Extended Too Far for Arbitration Sponsoring Firms?, 51 B.C. L. REV. 557 (2010) (discussing 
conflict of interest concerns for private arbitration firms that administer arbitration proceedings for 
their large corporate clients). 
 3. See AM. BAR ASS’N & AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/dispute/commercial_disputes.authcheckdam.pdf.  In 1977, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) and the American Arbitration Association (AAA) jointly created the Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, which was a comprehensive and well regarded set of standards 
for arbitrators.  Id.  In 2004, the ABA and the AAA updated the Code of Ethics to reflect the 
changing nature of arbitration practice, particularly in consumer and employment arbitration.  Id.  
“The use of arbitration to resolve a wide variety of disputes has grown extensively and forms a 
significant part of the system of justice on which our society relies for a fair determination of legal 
rights.  Persons who act as arbitrators therefore undertake serious responsibilities to the public, as 
well as to the parties.”  Id.  Of course, these provider rules do not have the force of law, but many 
courts use them as guidance on issues of arbitrator conduct.  See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby 
Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing what the Code of Ethics requires), 
amended by 728 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 4. As noted in Part III, the 2002 changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct now 
explicitly apply to attorneys engaged in arbitration practice.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2003) (including representation before an arbitral tribunal as part of the 
definition of “tribunal”).  These rules, of course, only apply to attorneys and not to other arbitration 
participants.  Other common rules of litigation ethics—regarding perjury, suborning perjury, 
document tampering, or document destruction—have not yet been extended to arbitration.  See infra 
Part III. 
 5. See infra Part III.  The “proper amount” of evidence is a looser concept in arbitration as 
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These ethical concerns permeate popular media, as well as case law.  
For instance, in 2007, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) issued $12.5 million in sanctions against Morgan Stanley for 
intentionally withholding e-mail evidence from arbitration claimants and 
falsely claiming that the e-mail communications had been destroyed in 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.6  
Morgan Stanley, in fact, preserved the e-mails on back-up tapes stored at 
another location.7  Nine-and-a-half million dollars of the settlement 
would be distributed among “several thousand customers” with open 
cases during the relevant time frame.8  For the same transgressions, 
Morgan Stanley suffered a $1.4 billion jury verdict.9  Arguably, Morgan 
Stanley only incurred arbitration penalties because of its association with 
FINRA and not because the law required such sanctions. 
More recently, questions have arisen regarding Floyd Landis and his 
testimony under oath in a doping arbitration.10  Landis won the 2006 
Tour de France after falling behind in Stage Sixteen, only to rally to a 
miraculous comeback in Stage Seventeen of the Tour.11  Following the 
race, the International Cycling Union—the governing body for cycling—
confirmed that Landis tested positive for performance enhancing drugs in 
violation of anti-doping rules.12  Landis denied taking any illegal 
substances and challenged the allegations in an arbitration against the 
United States Anti-Doping Agency under the World Anti-Doping 
Code.13  Landis engaged in a public arbitration of epic proportion to 
                                                                                                                       
opposed to litigation.  Arbitration is not necessarily bound by any particular rules of procedure, 
much less the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As discussed in Part III, the ethical rules for 
attorneys set minimum standards with respect to document destruction.  These ethical rules, 
however, only apply to attorneys and not necessarily clients or pro se parties. 
 6. News Release, FINRA, Morgan Stanley to Pay $12.5 Million to Resolve FINRA Charges 
that It Failed to Provide Documents to Arbitration Claimants, Regulators (Sept. 27, 2007), available 
at http://www.finra.org/newsroom/newsreleases/2007/p037071. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Richard L. McConnell et al., Discovery of Electronic Information: The Scylla of Excessive 
Cost and the Charybdis of Potential Sanctions, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2006, at 52, available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/7380/discovery-electronic-information-scylla-excessive-
cost-and-charybdis-potential-sanctio. 
 10. See Amy Shipley, After Tour, Armstrong May Face Another Obstacle, WASH. POST, July 
18, 2010, at D01. 
 11. Maureen Weston, Anatomy of the First Public International Sports Arbitration and the 
Future of Public Arbitration After USADA v. Floyd Landis, 2 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED., 234, 234–35 
(2010). 
 12. Id. at 235. 
 13. See id. at 236–37.  At the time, the USADA had never lost a doping case to an athlete.  Id. 
at 236.  Unlike standard procedure, Landis requested that his hearings be public.  Id. at 237.  The 
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defend his alleged innocence.14  After a multi-day hearing, Landis lost by 
a 2–1 decision.15  More than two years after the announcement of the 
decision, Landis admitted to using banned substances, detailing 
“extensive, consistent use of the red blood cell booster erythropoietin 
(commonly known as EPO), testosterone, human growth hormone and 
frequent blood transfusions, along with female hormones and a one-time 
experiment with insulin, during the years he rode for the U.S. Postal 
Service and Switzerland-based Phonak teams.”16 
Despite the admission of lying under oath at arbitration, no serious 
inquiry has been conducted as to whether Landis committed perjury in 
the arbitral forum.17  In stark contrast, consider the testimony of Barry 
Bonds before a grand jury regarding whether he ever used performance 
enhancing drugs.  Bonds vehemently denied taking steroids under oath.18  
Now that baseball’s steroid scandal is in the public light, Bonds has 
stood trial for his testimony before the grand jury.19  As will be discussed 
in more detail, the current state of perjury laws helps explain why these 
two otherwise similar situations were handled so differently.20 
This Article considers whether the current law and arbitral 
mechanisms effectively curb parties and attorneys from committing acts 
simply not tolerated in litigation.  Part II considers why this problem—
the disconnect between litigation and private adjudication—has arisen in 
the first place.  Part III analyzes the perjury, tampering, and spoliation 
                                                                                                                       
USADA rules specifically allow for such a public procedure.  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE ARBITRATION OF OLYMPIC SPORT DOPING DISPUTES R. 4 
(2004), available at http://www.adr.org (click “Rules & Procedures,” then search for “Olympic”) 
(allowing an athlete to request a public hearing). 
 14. Weston, supra note 11, at 237–35.  The arbitration process included arbitrator selection 
issues, many discovery rulings, and a public hearing.  Id.  In addition, Landis engaged in an Internet 
campaign to rally support for himself—both financially and in terms of public opinion.  See id. at 
247–49 (describing Landis’s Wiki Defense Strategy). 
 15. Id. at 277. 
 16. Bonnie D. Ford, Landis Admits Doping, Accuses Lance, ESPN.COM (May 21, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/Story?id=5203604. 
 17. Dale Robertson, Lance Armstrong Doping Probe Ends With No Charges, HOUS. CHRON. 
Feb. 3, 2012, at A1 (“Landis wasn’t subpoenaed by the grand jury, either”). 
 18. Timeline: Barry Bonds and Steroid Allegations, NEWSDAY (Dec. 16, 2011, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.newsday.com/sports/baseball/timeline-barry-bonds-and-steroid-allegations-1.3394535. 
 19. United States v. Bonds, No. CR07-00732 SI, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011).  The 
jury convicted Bonds of obstruction of justice.  Id.  Roger Clemens also faces perjury charges for 
statements made before Congress based on his own steroid use.  Lester Munson, Roger Clemens’ 
Perjury Retrial Begins, ESPN.COM (Apr. 16, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/7817965/ 
roger-clemens-returns-court-retrial-perjury-charges. 
 20. See infra Part II (discussing the disconnect between litigation and private arbitration rules 
on perjury). 
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laws across the country, determining that, with the exception of attorney 
ethics rules, these traditional litigation rules, criminalizing certain 
conduct before a court, do not extend to the same actions in arbitration.  
Part III also discusses five major reasons why the perjury and tampering 
laws should be extended to the arbitral forum.  These reasons include the 
changing nature of arbitration over the course of the last four decades, 
the treatment of arbitration as a quasi-judicial forum, the application of 
immunity to arbitration participants, the failure of arbitration providers to 
regulate the conduct of arbitration participants, and the limited judicial 
review available to parties in arbitration—especially when those parties 
challenge the arbitration award as having been procured by fraud.  
Ultimately, this Article suggests making a simple legislative change that 
would extend the perjury and tampering laws to the arbitral forum.  The 
proposed legislative change would mirror a change already made in the 
attorney ethics rules extending the definitions of “tribunal” and “official 
proceedings” to explicitly include arbitration.  Through these simple 
definitional changes, the perjury and tampering laws would explicitly 
apply to the arbitral forum. 
II. ARBITRATION AS A “CREATURE OF CONTRACT” AND PRIVATE 
ADJUDICATION 
The arbitration process consists of parties who voluntarily submit 
their dispute to a third-party decision maker who adjudicates the dispute 
on its merits.21  Courts and commentators alike refer to arbitration as a 
“creature of contract,” therefore addressing any number of issues arising 
in the arbitration with contract principles.22  Arbitration as a contractual 
                                                          
 21. Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 318, 318–19 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005). 
 22. This idea is firmly rooted in the FAA, which enforces agreements to arbitrate and treats 
them like any other contract.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, 
Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 
410 (2010) (“[Section 2] also establishes that arbitration is a creature of contract law and that 
arbitrational provisions should be viewed in this light.”).  For example, courts use this language to 
determine whether the parties ever consented to the arbitral process.  See, e.g., United Steelworkers 
v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To be sure, since 
arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must always inquire, when a party seeks to invoke its aid 
to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the 
particular dispute.”).  Courts also consider contractual intent when determining whether the 
arbitrator acted within his or her powers.  See Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 194 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“As we have stressed, ‘[a]rbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, and an 
arbitrator’s authority is derived from an agreement to arbitrate.’” (quoting Allstate Settlement Corp. 
v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2009))); Edstrom Indus., Inc. v. Companion 
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agreement is well rooted in federal and state arbitration law.23  
Arbitration simply does not exist without the consent of the parties 
involved.24 
By law, courts generally limit their involvement in the arbitral 
process.25  The primary purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
and the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) are to enforce written 
agreements to arbitrate26 and to give parties the right to enforce 
arbitration awards as if they were judgments of a court,27 provided that 
the award is not vacated under the limited grounds allowed by law.28  
Outside of these two circumstances—sometimes called the “front-end” 
                                                                                                                       
Life Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (“But precisely because arbitration is a creature of 
contract, the arbitrator cannot disregard the lawful directions the parties have given them.  If they tell 
him to apply Wisconsin law, he cannot apply New York law.”), abrogation recognized by Affymax, 
Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2011); Scott D. Marrs & Sean P. 
Milligan, What You Always Wanted to Know About Arbitration: Five Arbitration Issues Recently 
Decided by the Courts, 73 TEX. B. J. 634, 634 (2010) (“Because arbitration is a creature of contract, 
the rights and obligations of the parties and the arbitrators are, to an important extent, borne out of 
the arbitration clause itself.”).  Courts invoke this phrase also when determining who, in fact, is 
bound to arbitrate.  See, e.g., Dunmire v. Schneider, 481 F.3d 465, 467 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Arbitration 
is a creature of contract, as Dunmire stresses, but the party to be bound here is Dunmire himself: his 
signature is on the contract.”). 
 23. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (1956) (“A written 
agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to 
submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable . . . .”).  This language, essentially, puts agreements to arbitrate on equal footing with 
other contracts and is intended to reverse judicial hostility toward agreements to arbitrate, which—at 
the time Congress passed the FAA in 1925—were considered “executory” contracts not enforceable 
by specific performance.  STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 23 
(2d ed. 2007). 
 24. This Article recognizes a small minority of disputes subject to arbitration by law.  When 
arbitration is mandated by law—as opposed to by contract—the arbitration procedure must usually 
be non-binding to preserve the parties’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.  WARE, supra 
note 23, at 19–20.  In the case of contractual arbitration, parties are free to waive their Seventh 
Amendment rights to participate voluntarily in the arbitral process.  See Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. 
v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The Seventh Amendment does not confer the right to a 
trial, but only the right to have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation should 
proceed before a court.  If the claims are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement, the jury trial right vanishes.” (citing Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). 
 25. See supra note 1 (discussing courts’ limited review of the arbitral process). 
 26. See supra note 23. 
 27. Section 9 of the FAA provides that any party to an arbitration can apply to the court to enter 
judgment upon the award such that the award becomes an order of the court.  9 U.S.C. § 9; see also 
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11 (1956); REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 22 (2000). 
 28. See supra note 1 (discussing courts’ limited review of the arbitral process). 
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and the “back-end” of arbitration—courts largely refrain from interfering 
in the arbitral process.29 
Courts rightly do not, generally, interfere in the arbitral process, thus 
giving effect to the parties’ contractual agreement.  After all, giving 
effect to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate necessarily means that the 
courts should have a hands-off approach during the arbitral process.30  
These parties have voluntarily relinquished their right to a trial by jury31 
and agreed to have their current or future dispute32 resolved by a third-
party arbitrator.  Arbitrators, for the most part, are competent to handle 
the disputes presented to them, even complex questions of law.33 
Thus, arbitration has a natural—and contractual—independence from 
the judicial process.  This independence helps account for some of the 
primary benefits of arbitration, including confidentiality, cost and time 
efficiencies, informality, finality, and the ability of the parties to continue 
a working relationship with each other after the arbitrator resolves the 
dispute.34  These benefits flow from arbitration’s disconnect from the 
                                                          
 29. The FAA, UAA, and Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) provide for some limited 
involvement by courts in arbitration, such as assisting in appointing an arbitrator, 9 U.S.C. § 5; UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT § 3 (1956); REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11 (2000), or providing a 
subpoena power to compel witnesses to testify at an arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 9; UNIF. ARBITRATION 
ACT § 7; REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17.  Otherwise, courts are generally not available to 
interfere until the arbitral process is over.  The RUAA also gives courts the ability to order 
provisional remedies to the parties to the arbitration if an arbitrator has not yet been appointed at the 
time that the need for such provisional remedies arises.  REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 8. 
 30. Of course, this statement does not extend to the lawful role of courts regarding enforcement 
and arbitrability issues and in determining whether an award should be vacated or confirmed. 
 31. See supra note 24 (discussing the waiver of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial). 
 32. Often, arbitration agreements are “pre-dispute” contracts, meaning that the parties 
contracted in advance to resolve any dispute by binding arbitration.  For example, two businesses in 
a long-term relationship might include as part of their contract that they agree to resolve any disputes 
arising under the contract by arbitration in order to take advantage of the speed, efficiency, and 
flexibility of arbitration—particularly given the parties’ relationship with one another.  The practice 
is now commonplace in employment agreements and many consumer agreements as well, although 
it is significantly more controversial than pre-dispute arbitration agreements between businesses.  
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631–
32 (2005). 
 33. For many years, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism of an arbitrator’s abilities to 
decide questions of law.  See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–37 (1953) (expressing doubt that 
questions under the Securities Act could be expertly resolved by arbitrators, as opposed to judges), 
overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  The Court 
ultimately overruled Wilko in Rodriguez, holding that arbitrators are capable of determining complex 
issues of law in the area of securities.  490 U.S. at 486.  The Rodriguez decision followed Mitsubishi 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., in which the Supreme Court held that arbitrators are competent to 
handle complex antitrust cases.  Id. at 482 (discussing Mitsubishi).  Shortly after Rodriguez, the 
Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., holding that arbitration of a case under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act was appropriate.  500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
 34. Cole & Blankley, supra note 21, at 318–19.  For example, arbitration has flexible and 
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more “traditional” and rights-based adjudication in the state and federal 
courts in the United States.35 
This disconnect, while largely beneficial for arbitration participants, 
breeds the possibility of abuse.  Without judicial oversight, or even 
significant recourse to the judicial system, the standards of ethical 
participation in the arbitral forum become blurred.  What incentives exist 
for arbitration participants to tell the truth, to preserve relevant 
documents—especially harmful documents—or to ensure that witnesses 
are available to testify at the arbitration hearing?  As explained in Part 
III, traditional litigation rules, such as those related to perjury, witness 
tampering, and document destruction, likely do not apply to the 
arbitration forum.  Making the situation worse, courts will consider 
vacating an arbitral award because of alleged improper conduct on the 
part of parties or witnesses using an inexplicably more burdensome 
standard of review than is used to review other types of errors.36 
Simple legislative changes discussed in Part III can make the arbitral 
process fairer for participants in situations involving abuse of the arbitral 
process.  Making these small changes could have a drastic impact on the 
perception of arbitration as a fair process,37 while hopefully encouraging 
participants to act within ethical boundaries and creating more respect for 
the arbitral process. 
                                                                                                                       
informal procedures compared to traditional, civil litigation in the United States.  Arbitral hearings 
often occur in conference rooms, not courthouses.  Hearings occurring over multiple days may not 
occur consecutively if scheduling the hearing over time is advantageous to the parties or the 
arbitrator.  Arbitrators also have greater involvement in the merits’ presentation compared to judges, 
often engaging in witness questioning and asking for additional information of attorneys. 
 35. This Article is limited to a discussion of arbitrations occurring within the United States.  
International arbitration involves a whole host of ethics issues not covered in this Article. 
 36. See infra Part III.C.6.  Courts can review arbitration awards for “fraud,” and most 
challenges for fraud involve a showing of fraud by “clear and convincing” evidence.  See Bonar v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988).  No other arbitral review contains 
this heightened standard.  As discussed in Part III.C.6, this standard is out of line with other avenues 
for review and should be eliminated to prevent ethical abuses and to keep the review for “fraud” in 
line with other avenues of review for arbitration. 
 37. Currently, arbitration’s reputation is sullied as an unfair forum.  The primary criticism of 
arbitration has been that arbitrators are biased in favor of large companies and employers who are 
“repeat players” in arbitration—and who often pay for the arbitrator fees—at the cost of one-time 
players, such as employees and consumers.  See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical 
Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1059–60 
(2009) (analyzing data on consumer arbitrations released by the National Forum of Arbitration).  
Some of these criticisms seem to have tainted the perception of arbitration as a whole. 
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III. QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES IN ARBITRATION AND WHETHER 
“COURT”-DESIGNED RULES APPLY 
Although the limited role of courts in the arbitral process creates 
many efficiencies, this same disconnect also creates certain ethical 
loopholes in the administration of justice.  This section considers 
whether perjury statutes and ethical rules apply to the forum of 
arbitration and considers what rules exist to preserve evidence for 
arbitration.  This section concludes by noting how these fundamental 
ethical rules generally to not extend to the arbitral forum, outside of the 
context of attorney misconduct.  Therefore, this section advocates simple 
legislative changes to create a fairer playing field in arbitration and real 
repercussions for those arbitral parties who abuse the process. 
A. Why Perjury Laws Generally Do Not Apply to Arbitral Proceedings 
This section seeks to answer a relatively straightforward question: 
Do perjury laws and ethical rules apply to arbitration at all?  
Surprisingly, a fifty-state survey of perjury laws reveals that these laws 
do not, in fact, apply to arbitration—or at least not by their plain 
language.  By contrast, however, the attorney ethics rules do prohibit 
attorneys from suborning perjury, but no consequences appear to befall a 
lying witness.  Similarly, a fifty-state survey of document destruction 
rules reveals that outside of the realm of attorney ethics, no sanctions 
exist for clients and other individuals guilty of evidentiary spoliation. 
1. Perjury Statutes Almost Never Explicitly Apply to Arbitration 
The purpose of perjury laws is to encourage truth-telling in official 
matters by providing criminal consequences for lying under oath.38  One 
commentator noted: “‘Perjury strikes at the very heart of our system . . . .  
                                                          
 38. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) (noting that all “perjured relevant testimony is 
at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth.  Therefore it cannot be 
denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial.”); United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 
559, 562 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing the purpose of the perjury statutes as “truth-seeking”); Lisa 
Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 
1522 (2009) (“The perjury statute, which punishes knowingly making false, material statements 
under oath, protects the integrity of the court system.”); Linda F. Harrison, The Law of Lying: The 
Difficulty of Pursuing Perjury Under the Federal Perjury Statutes, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 397, 399 
(2003) (describing the legislative purposes behind perjury laws as based in encouraging truthful 
testimony). 
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When people lie in court, it undermines the whole process.  The problem 
is so bad that it is severely evaporating confidence people have in the 
court system.’”39  The exact same concerns exist in arbitration.  
Adjudication based on false information undermines the system—
whether it occurs in the litigation system or the arbitral system. 
As will be discussed in more detail, whether a person commits 
perjury by lying under oath in arbitration largely depends on whether 
arbitration is considered an “official proceeding” covered by the perjury 
statutes.  The term “official proceeding” stems from the 1976 definition 
of perjury in the Model Penal Code (MPC),40 adopted by a majority of 
states.41  Arbitration is simply not mentioned in the MPC chapter 
regarding perjury. 
In contrast, the attorney ethics rules regarding truthfulness and 
suborning perjury turn on whether the false statements were made before 
a “tribunal.”42  In 2002, the American Bar Association added to its list of 
definitions the word “tribunal,” which includes binding arbitration.43  
Because of these more recent changes to the attorney ethics rules, there is 
a great disparity between traditional perjury ramifications for 
untruthfulness in arbitration and attorney obligations towards a tribunal, 
including an arbitral tribunal. 
a. The Widely Used “Official Proceedings” Language Is Ambiguous in 
Its Applicability to Arbitration 
Unsurprisingly, a large number of state legislatures enacted perjury 
laws in line with the MPC.  Under the MPC, a person is guilty of perjury 
“if in any official proceeding, he makes a false statement under oath or 
                                                          
 39. Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, A.B.A. J. May 1995, at 69 (quoting former ABA Section 
of Litigation chair David Weiner); see also John L. Watts, To Tell The Truth: A Qui Tam Action for 
Perjury in a Civil Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial System, 79 
TEMP. L. REV. 773, 784 (2006) (“While this reluctance to criminally prosecute perjury in civil cases 
may be understandable, it is regrettable because perjury undermines the real and perceived 
legitimacy of the civil judicial system.”). 
 40. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“A person is guilty of 
perjury, a felony of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under 
the oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, 
when the statement is material and he does not believe it to be true.” (emphasis added)). 
 41. See infra Part III.A.1.a. 
 42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly[] make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”). 
 43. Id. R. 1.0(m) (“‘Tribunal’ denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding 
or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity.”). 
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equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement 
previously made, when the statement is material and he does not believe 
it to be true.”44  The MPC defines “official proceeding” as “a proceeding 
heard or which may be heard before any legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other governmental agency or official authorized to 
take evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, 
commissioner, notary or other person taking testimony or deposition in 
connection with any such proceeding.”45  The terms “arbitration” and 
“arbitrator” are not found anywhere in this definition. 
The following states adopted a perjury statute similar to the MPC 
that relies on the term “official proceeding”: Alabama,46 Colorado,47 
Connecticut,48 Florida,49 Hawaii,50 Illinois,51 Kansas,52 Kentucky,53 
Maine,54 Missouri,55 Montana,56 Nebraska,57 New Hampshire,58 New 
                                                          
 44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 45. Id. § 240.0(4). 
 46. ALA. CODE § 13A-10-101 (2010) (defining perjury as “in any Official proceeding”); id. 
§ 13A-10-100(b)(5) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 47. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-502 (West 2004) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 18-8-501(3) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-156 (West 2004) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 53a-146(1) (defining “official proceeding”).  Connecticut case law suggests that 
certain types of common law actions for perjury, including making false statements at arbitral, 
church, and grand jury proceedings are not covered under the MPC definition of “official 
proceeding.”  State v. Salafia, 284 A.2d 576, 578 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1971) (“The common-law 
definition of the crime was found to apply to testimony before arbitrators, before a church tribunal, 
before a grand jury, and in taking the poor debtor’s oath before a justice of the peace.” (citations 
omitted)).  Other case law, however, describes arbitration as a “quasi-judicial” proceeding, opening 
the door for the perjury statute to apply to arbitrations.  Preston v. O’Rourke, 811 A.2d 753, 760 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (“Oftentimes, ‘[a]rbitration is a quasi-judicial proceeding.’” (quoting 
Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 171–74 (2d Cir. 1984))). 
 49. FLA. STAT. § 837.02 (2000) (defining perjury in an “official proceeding”); id. § 837.011(1) 
(defining “official proceeding”).  Florida makes perjury not in an official proceeding a misdemeanor 
rather than a felony. 
 50. HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1060 (West 2008) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 710-1000(12) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 51. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/32-2(a) (West 2010) (defining perjury as “in a proceeding or 
in any other matter where by law . . . oath or affirmation is required”). 
 52. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5903(a)(1) (Supp. 2011) (defining perjury as a crime committed 
“before any court, tribunal, public body, notary public or other officer authorized to administer 
oaths”). 
 53. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.020 (West 2006) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 523.010(3) (2010) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 54. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 451(1) (2006) (defining perjury as “[i]n any official 
proceeding”); id. § 451(5)(A) (defining “official proceeding”).  Maine also has a civil cause of 
action for perjury—the only state to have such a statute.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 870 (2003).  
The statute provides: 
When a judgment has been obtained against a party by the perjury of a witness 
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Mexico,59 North Dakota,60 Ohio,61 Pennsylvania,62 Utah,63 and 
Washington.64  The applicability of these statutes to the arbitral forum is 
unclear.  The definition of “official proceeding” leaves some room for 
interpretation, especially under the “other person taking testimony” 
                                                                                                                       
introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party may, within 3 years after that 
judgment or after final disposition of any motion for relief from the judgment, bring an 
action against such adverse party, or any perjured witness or confederate in the perjury, to 
recover the damages sustained by the injured party by reason of such perjury.  The 
judgment in the former action does not bar an action under this section. 
Id.  The applicability of this statute to arbitration is questionable.  On the one hand, arbitration 
results in awards—not judgments.  On the other hand, an award confirmed in court has the effect of 
a judgment.  Id. § 5940 (“Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an 
award, judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other 
judgment or decree.”). 
 55. MO. ANN. STAT. § 575.040(1) (West 2011) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 575.010(7) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-201(1) (2011) (defining perjury as “in any official proceeding”). 
 57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-915(1) (2009) (defining perjury as “in any official proceeding”); id. 
§ 28-916(3) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 58. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:1(I) (2007) (defining perjury as “in any official proceeding”); 
id. § 641:1(II) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 59. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-25-1(A) (West Supp. 2011) (defining perjury as in any “official 
proceeding”); id. § 30-1-12(G) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 60. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-11-01(1) (West Supp. 2011) (defining perjury as “in any 
official proceeding); id. § 12.1-01-04(22) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.11(A) (West 2006) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 2921.01(D) (West Supp. 2011) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 62. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4902 (West 1983) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 4501 (defining “official proceeding”). 
 63. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-502 (West 2004) (defining perjury as “in any official 
proceeding”); id. § 76-8-501(1) (defining “official proceeding”). 
 64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.020 (West Supp. 2012) (defining perjury as “in any 
official proceeding”); id. § 9A.72.010(4) (2009) (defining “official proceeding”).  The Washington 
perjury laws, like some other state laws, require that the oath taken be an oath mandated by law.  See 
§ 9A.72.020 (requiring false statement to be made “under an oath required or authorized by law”); 
see also id. § 9A.72.010(3) (“An oath is ‘required or authorized by law’ when the use of the oath is 
specifically provided for by statute or regulatory provision or when the oath is administered by a 
person authorized by state or federal law to administer oaths.”).  As discussed in Part II, arbitration is 
generally a private dispute-resolution proceeding taking place outside of the court system.  
Accordingly no statutes “require” that an oath be administered within the arbitral forum.  Certainly, 
many—if not most—arbitrators require that witnesses testify under oath, but such requirement is an 
arbitral requirement, not a statutory requirement.  The American Arbitration Association Rules 
recognize that oaths are not necessarily required by law. Commercial Rule 25 provides: “Before 
proceeding with the first hearing, each arbitrator may take an oath of office and, if required by law, 
shall do so.  The arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath administered by any duly 
qualified person and, if it is required by law or requested by any party, shall do so.”  AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R. 25 (2009); see also JAMS, JAMS 
COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 22(c) (2010) (“The Arbitrator shall 
require witnesses to testify under oath if requested by any party, or otherwise in the discretion of the 
Arbitrator.”). 
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portion of the definition.65  Does arbitration constitute a proceeding 
where testimony is being taken by the statutory “other person”? 
Courts are split on whether arbitration falls under the MPC definition 
of “official proceeding.”66  If courts apply traditional rules of statutory 
interpretation, then the MPC definition of “official proceeding” should 
not include an arbitral forum.  To the extent that this ambiguous phrase at 
the end of the definition needs to be interpreted, it should be interpreted 
in line with the previously enumerated proceedings, i.e., judicial 
proceedings, legislative proceedings, administrative proceedings, 
depositions associated with the same, and the like.67  Additionally, the 
ambiguous phrase “any other person” is arguably limited by the phrase 
“governmental agency or official.”68  Contractual arbitrations, for the 
most part, take place outside of the realm of the government.  
Accordingly, the crime of perjury under the MPC likely does not extend 
to the arbitral forum. 
                                                          
 65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.0(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 66. For instance, numerous Florida cases granted arbitration witnesses immunity, noting the 
perjury consequences for falsely testifying under oath in arbitration.  See Kidwell v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 975 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (applying witness immunity in part because 
“[a]n arbitration hearing, although informal, is a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding”); Ruskin v. 
Ryan, 859 So. 2d 1218 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming decision against former arbitration 
claimant based on perjury and other misconduct in arbitration); Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, 
752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (prohibiting a client from bringing a malpractice claim against former 
attorney when the client perjured himself on the advice of counsel).  Illinois law, too, holds that 
witnesses in arbitration are immune from defamation lawsuits, noting in dicta that the perjury laws 
must apply to these witnesses.  Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997) (“Under Illinois law, absolute immunity applied to the arbitration hearing in this case.  We 
wish to emphasize, however, that this does not mean that persons may lie to arbitrators with 
impunity.  While absolute privilege provides complete immunity from civil action, it does not 
preclude criminal prosecution for perjury . . . .” (citations omitted)).  In contrast, Nebraska perjury 
law only applies to a non-judicial “official proceeding” if the legislature requires that the procedure 
be given under oath.  State v. Douglas, 388 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Neb. 1986).  Unlike the Washington 
statute, see supra note 64, the Nebraska statute defining “official proceeding” is the exact same, 
facially broad definition found in the MPC.  The Nebraska Supreme Court’s judicial gloss on this 
definition is not necessarily dictated by the text of the statute. 
 67. This interpretation is in line with the statutory canon of ejusdem generis, which means that a 
court should interpret a generic term in line with more specific terms that precede the generic term. 
 68. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.0(4) (emphasis added).  This reading is generally in line 
with good grammar.  The statutory language provides: “or other governmental agency or official 
authorized to take evidence under oath, including . . . [a] notary or other person taking testimony . . . 
in connection with any such proceeding.”  Id.  Thus, the “other person” must be a governmental 
official.  Also, the testimony must be before a judicial, legislative, or administrative agency.  
Arbitration is none of these and, thus, falls outside the MPC definition. 
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b. The Statutes Prohibiting Lying “Under Oath” Are Also Ambiguous 
Other states have adopted more generic perjury laws that simply 
prohibit lying under oath or making false sworn statements.69  If the 
statute prohibits lying under oath, and arbitral testimony is given under 
oath, then presumably these statutes would apply to arbitration.  Courts, 
however, do not universally accept this interpretation. 
States enacting these more generic perjury statutes include: Alaska,70 
Arizona,71 Arkansas,72 California,73 Delaware,74 District of Columbia,75 
Idaho,76 Indiana,77 Iowa,78 Maryland,79 Michigan,80 Minnesota,81 
                                                          
 69. Many jurisdictions have a secondary offense of “false swearing.”  For states following the 
MPC, the false swearing statute covers lying under oath not in an official proceeding, as well as 
statements made in an official proceeding that fail the materiality prong of the test.  MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 241.2 (proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 70. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.56.200 (West 2007) (defining perjury); id. § 11.56.240 (defining 
“sworn statement”).  Alaska’s statute applies to arbitration proceedings.  See Gilbert v. Sperbeck, 
126 P.3d 1057, 1060 (Alaska 2005) (assuming, without deciding, that perjury rules apply to 
arbitration proceedings). 
 71. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2702 (2010) (defining perjury); id. § 13-2701 (defining “sworn 
statement”).  Arizona courts, similarly, have applied perjury laws to arbitration—albeit attorney fee 
arbitration conducted by the judicial branch.  See, e.g., State v. Self, 661 P.2d 224, 228 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that the “sworn statement” language in the perjury statute facially applies to 
arbitration, and finding that an arbitration hearing before the State Bar Committee constituted an 
“official proceeding” for the tampering charges). 
 72. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-2-103 (West 2004) (defining perjury). 
 73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1999) (defining perjury). 
 74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1221 (West 2010) (defining perjury).  Delaware, however, defines 
“testimony” as “an oral statement made under oath in a proceeding before any court, body, agency, 
public servant or other person authorized to conduct the proceeding and to administer the oath or 
cause it to be administered.”  Id. § 1235(f).  This definition of testimony is similar to the MPC 
definition of “official proceeding” and likely would be interpreted in a similar manner: excluding 
testimony before an arbitral body.  See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 75. D.C. CODE § 22-2402(a) (2001) (defining perjury).  Although the D.C. courts have not 
ruled on whether arbitration counts as a “competent tribunal,” they have ruled that a Congressional 
hearing so qualifies.  See Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236, 238–39 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 76. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5401 (West 2006) (defining perjury). 
 77. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-2-1(a)(1) (West 2004) (“A person who: (1) makes a false, material 
statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be 
true . . . .”).  This statute also criminalizes the making of two material, inconsistent statements where 
one is necessarily false, provided that the statements occur “in a proceeding before a court or grand 
jury.”  Id. § 35-44-2-1(a)(2). 
 78. IOWA CODE ANN. § 720.2 (West 2003) (defining perjury).  Iowa courts interpreted this 
statute as applying to mandatory arbitrations within the worker’s compensation scheme.  Cont’l Fire 
Sprinkler Co. v. Hoolandt, No. 01-0301, 2002 WL 700977, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002). 
 79. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-101(a) (West 2002) (defining perjury). 
 80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.423 (West 2004) (“Any person authorized by any statute of 
this state to take an oath, or any person of whom an oath shall be required by law, who shall willfully 
swear falsely, in regard to any matter or thing, respecting which such oath is authorized or required, 
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Mississippi,82 New York,83 Oklahoma,84 Oregon,85 Rhode Island,86 South 
Carolina,87 South Dakota,88 Tennessee;89 Texas,90 and Virginia.91  
Although none of these statutes are identical, they all have a broad 
prohibition against lying under oath.  The few cases interpreting these 
statutes generally hold that these statutes apply to arbitration proceedings 
or, more generally, to other situations in which a declarant testifies under 
oath but not at trial.92 
                                                                                                                       
shall be guilty of perjury, a felony . . . .”).  In addition, Michigan has a separate statute for perjury in 
courts.  Id. § 750.422 (making “[a]ny person who, being lawfully required to depose the truth in any 
proceeding in a court of justice guilty of perjury”). 
 81. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.48(1) (West Supp. 2012). 
 82. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-59 (West 2011).  Mississippi courts apply this perjury statute to 
judicial proceedings other than civil and criminal trials.  See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 584 So. 2d 
733, 739–42 (Miss. 1991) (discussing perjury charges based on a grand jury proceeding); Ford v. 
State, 956 So. 2d 301, 305–06 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a conviction for perjury based on a 
statement made at a probation revocation hearing). 
 83. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15 (McKinney 2010) (defining perjury); id. § 210.00 (defining 
testimony).  New York courts interpreted these statutes to apply to a hearing before the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), a body that widely uses arbitration to resolve disputes.  
People v. Cohen, 773 N.Y.S.2d 371, 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 84. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 491 (West 2002) (defining perjury). 
 85. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162.065(1) (West 2003) (defining perjury).  In at least one case, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon applied the perjury statute to a statement outside of court—a statement in 
an application for a materialman’s lien.  State v. Carr, 877 P.2d 1192, 1193–94 (Or. 1994). 
 86. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-33-1(a) (West 2006) (defining perjury). 
 87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-30 (2003) (defining perjury).  South Carolina, like Michigan, see 
supra note 80, also has a separate statute for perjury in judicial—and other—governmental 
proceedings.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-10. 
 88. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-29-1 (2006) (defining perjury); see also State v. Brown, 480 
N.W.2d 761, 761 (S.D. 1992) (affirming perjury conviction based on sworn testimony given to the 
South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment). 
 89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-702(a) (West 2011) (defining perjury).  Tennessee courts 
interpret this statute broadly.  See State v. Caraway, No. W2004-02948-CCA-R3-CO, 2005 WL 
3287944, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 2, 2005) (“As relevant here, a conviction for the offense of 
perjury merely requires proof that an accused made a false statement, under oath, with intent to 
deceive.”). 
 90. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.02(a) (West 2011) (defining perjury).  This statute applies to 
written statements under oath, even if the statements are not in the form of affidavits.  See Martin v. 
State, 896 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).  Texas also has a separate statute for “aggravated 
perjury” if the perjury takes place in an “official proceeding.”  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.03 
(West 2011). 
 91. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (West Supp. 2011) (defining perjury); see also id. § 18.2-435 
(criminalizing conflicting testimony as perjury).  Under Virginia law, any swearing under oath falls 
under the perjury statutes, not just swearing in judicial proceedings.  Scott v. Commonwealth, 416 
S.E.2d 47, 49 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (“Neither Code § 18.2-434 nor Code § 18.2-435 expressly 
restricts ‘testimony’ to testimony given in judicial proceedings.  In fact, Code § 18.2-434 provides 
that it is perjury to swear falsely when an oath is lawfully administered ‘on any occasion.’”). 
 92. See Gilbert v. Sperbeck, 126 P.3d 1057, 1060 (Alaska 2005) (assuming, without deciding, 
that the perjury rules apply equally to arbitration proceedings); State v. Self, 661 P.2d 224, 228–29 
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Compared to the MPC definition of perjury, this broader definition 
more easily extends to arbitration.  Because the statute does not limit 
perjury to “official proceedings,” arbitration should fall squarely within 
the definition, even if not explicitly mentioned in the statute.  This 
interpretation is far from assured given the ambiguities in the wording of 
the statutes.  As will be discussed more fully,93 the clearest definition of 
perjury would explicitly reference arbitration; but for statutes that are 
deliberately vague, remaining vague will likely be the best statutory 
option. 
c. A Minority of States Have Statutes Explicitly Applying toArbitration 
or Only to Judicial Proceedings 
A small minority of states have more specific perjury statutes than 
the ones discussed previously.94  Only one state statute specifically 
references arbitration in its perjury statute, and the others only mention 
litigation—presumably to the exclusion of other instances in which a 
person makes a statement under oath. 
Wisconsin is the only state that specifically mentions arbitration in 
its perjury statute.  The arbitration provision, however, is quite limited in 
its scope.  Under Wisconsin law, a person commits perjury if he makes a 
false material statement under oath, knowing the statement to be false, in 
a court, before a magistrate, before an agency, or before “[a]n 
administrative agency or arbitrator authorized by statute to determine 
issues of fact.”95  Again, because contractual arbitration falls outside of 
the legal system, this statute would not expressly extend to private, 
contractual arbitration.96  The specific inclusion of a hearing before an 
                                                                                                                       
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the “sworn statement” language in the perjury statute facially 
applies to arbitration, and finding that an arbitration hearing before the State Bar Committee 
constituted an “official proceeding” for the tampering charges); Cont’l Fire Sprinkler Co. v. 
Hoolandt, No. 01-0301, 2002 WL 700977, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (acknowledging 
perjury in a worker’s compensation arbitration); Scott, 416 S.E.2d at 49 (“Neither Code § 18.2-434 
nor Code § 18.2-435 expressly restricts ‘testimony’ to testimony given in judicial proceedings.  In 
fact, Code § 18.2-434 provides that “it is perjury to swear falsely when an oath is lawfully 
administered ‘on any occasion.’”). 
 93. See infra Part III.C. 
 94. See supra Parts III.A.1.a–b. 
 95. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.31(1) (West 2005) (emphasis added).  The statute also lists other 
audiences for the perjury, including notary publics and officers conducting inquests of the dead.  Id. 
 96. See Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 262 N.W.2d 218, 228–
29 (Wis. 1978) (holding that a labor arbitration fell within the perjury statute because the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission was authorized by statute to select arbitrators). 
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arbitrator “authorized by statute to determine issues of fact” likely means 
that any other arbitration would be interpreted as falling outside the 
scope of the statute.97  For being the state with the only mention of 
arbitration in the statute, the statute appears to have less effect than some 
more general perjury statutes.98 
In contrast, New Jersey uses an MPC definition of perjury99 but 
defines “official proceeding” to include arbitration.  Under New Jersey 
law, an “official proceeding” is a proceeding “heard or which may be 
heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
governmental agency, arbitration proceeding, or official authorized to 
take evidence under oath, including any arbitrator.”100  Although this 
wording is somewhat ambiguous, the arbitration provision appears to be 
a “stand alone” consideration, and not tied to any official governmental 
proceedings.  If interpreted in this manner, the New Jersey perjury law 
applies more clearly to arbitration than any other state’s perjury law. 
On the other side of specificity, some state perjury statutes are 
specifically limited to litigation procedures.  For instance, perjury in 
Georgia is limited to statements made “in a judicial proceeding.”101  The 
Louisiana perjury law only applies in a “judicial proceeding” before a 
board “authorized to take testimony” or in legislative proceedings.102  
The Massachusetts law applies solely in a “proceeding in a court of 
justice”103 and does not extend to testimony at a labor arbitration.104  The 
                                                          
 97. Under the canon of expressio unius, the inclusion of one thing suggests the exclusion of 
other things. 
 98. See supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 99. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(a) (West 2005) (defining perjury in any official proceeding). 
 100. Id. § 2C:27-1(d). 
 101. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-70(a) (West 2003).  Georgia courts apply this statute narrowly.  
See, e.g., Carter v. State, 516 S.E.2d 556, 562–63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that statements made 
in an application for a court-appointed attorney did not occur in a “judicial proceeding”).  Georgia 
also has a more general “false swearing” statute that carries a lesser penalty than the perjury statute.  
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-71(a) (“A person to whom a lawful oath or affirmation has been 
administered or who executes a document knowing that it purports to be an acknowledgment of a 
lawful oath or affirmation commits the offense of false swearing when, in any matter or thing other 
than a judicial proceeding, he knowingly and willfully makes a false statement.”). 
 102. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:123(A) (2004 & Supp. 2012). 
 103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268 § 1 (West 2012). 
 104. Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 372 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Mass. 1978) (“While a witness at a 
judicial proceeding is free to make defamatory statements without fear of being sued by the defamed 
person, the witness is nevertheless subject to the control of the judge.  If he or she gives false 
testimony, prosecution for perjury or punishment for contempt may be forthcoming.  Such 
protections against false testimony, simply do not exist at a labor grievance hearing such as the one 
which took place here.”).  The Ezekiel court recognized only a qualified immunity for grievance 
arbitration witnesses.  Id. 
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Nevada perjury law applies to statements made in a judicial proceeding 
or when otherwise required by law.105  The North Carolina law similarly 
provides that perjury occurs when the witness making false statements is 
“lawfully required to be sworn or affirmed.”106  The Vermont perjury 
statute only applies “in a proceeding in a court of justice or in a contested 
case before a state agency.”107  The West Virginia perjury law applies 
only at a “trial” or a “grand jury” in felony proceedings.108  The 
Wyoming perjury law applies to statements in “judicial, legislative or 
administrative proceedings.”109  These statutes are quite limited in their 
scope and likely do not apply to arbitral proceedings.  Updated statutes 
would help keep these states in line with increased arbitration practice 
and the need for greater protections in arbitration. 
Federal law also falls within this category of statutes.  The general 
perjury statute applies to witnesses “having taken an oath before a 
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the 
United States authorizes an oath to be administered.”110  Nothing in the 
FAA speaks to the ability to administer oaths, permissive or otherwise.111  
Without a direct mention of an oath within the statute, arbitrations cannot 
be tribunals “in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be 
administered.”  Thus, federal law provides no support for a truth-telling 
                                                          
 105. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.120 (West 2011).  Nevada case law emphasizes that an oath 
must be required by law—i.e., not voluntary—before the statute applies.  Licata v. State, 661 P.2d 
1306, 1307 (Nev. 1983) (“We construe the language of the statute to mean that a perjury charge may 
be sustained only where the false statement was made in a judicial or other setting where an oath or 
affirmation is legally required.  Appellant’s voluntary statement taken in the insurance company 
lawyer’s office does not fall within the purview of the statute and thus, appellant could not have been 
found guilty of perjury in this case.”). 
 106. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-209 (West 2011).  Interestingly, despite the limited nature of 
the perjury statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court also held that a witness is immune from civil 
liability based on testimony given in an arbitration proceeding.  See Brewer v. Carolina Coach Co., 
116 S.E.2d 725, 728 (N.C. 1960) (affirming dismissal of civil suit for damages resulting from 
allegedly perjured testimony in an arbitration on the basis of witness immunity).  This article 
addresses witness immunity.  See infra Part III.C.4. 
 107. 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 2011). 
 108. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-1(a) (West 2012).  Even West Virginia’s statute for felony false 
swearing is limited to “trials.”  Id. § 61-5-2.  Case law interprets these statutes very narrowly.  See 
Farber v. Douglas, 361 S.E.2d 456, 463 (W.Va. 1985) (“In order to support a charge of false 
swearing . . . the person administering the oath or affirmation must be qualified to do so and the 
sworn testimony, document, or affidavit must be authorized by law to be rendered under an oath or 
affirmation.”); State v. Schoonover, 124 S.E.2d 340, 345 (W. Va. 1962) (“Obviously, if the Crime 
Commission of West Virginia was not constitutionally created, the defendant could not be convicted 
of false swearing as to testimony purportedly given before it.”). 
 109. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-301(a) (West 2011). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2006). 
 111. See 9 U.S.C. § 1–16 (2006). 
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requirement in arbitration, and this law, too, will need a revision to apply 
to the arbitral forum. 
2. Attorney Ethics Rules on Truthfulness Generally Apply to 
Arbitration 
While perjury statutes provide criminal consequences to witnesses 
who lie under oath, attorneys have additional obligations to be truthful 
toward a tribunal.  All attorneys are bound by ethical rules that govern 
their behavior, and each state promulgates its own ethical rules.112  Most 
states’ ethical rules model the version of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (the Model Rules) published in 2002.113  Unlike the MPC, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly apply to arbitration 
proceedings and other alternative dispute resolution processes.114 
The “Ethics 2000” revisions, changes made to the Model Rules by 
the ABA’s Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, contained a number of revisions to the ethical rules specifically 
targeted at alternative dispute resolution.115  Included in these revisions 
were rules for the attorney/advocate within ADR procedures, including 
arbitration.116  One of the ways that the Ethics 2000 Commission 
included arbitration practice within the parameters of the general rules 
                                                          
 112. See Susan Poser, Multijurisdictional Practice for a Multijurisdictional Profession, 81 NEB. 
L. REV. 1379, 1382 (2003) (“Historically, the state supreme courts have regulated the lawyers in 
their states.” (footnote omitted)).  Although the American Bar Association publishes a set of model 
rules of professional conduct, each state is free to adopt its own rules.  There exists no national bar 
association for attorneys and, therefore, no nationally applicable ethical rules for attorneys. 
 113. See Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_s
tate_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).  California is the only state that does not 
have rules following the Model Rules; only five states have not yet adopted the 2000 revisions.  Id. 
 114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 5 (2002). 
 115. See Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to 
Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption and State 
Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207, 207, 212–13 (2001) (“[T]here was little consideration of ethical 
issues affecting lawyers in ADR when the Kutak Commission drafted the Model Rules [adopted by 
the ABA in 1983] . . . .  Ethics 2000 provided a unique opportunity to incorporate these ADR-related 
principles into the Model Rules.”).  The changes considered both attorneys as advocates as well as 
attorneys serving as third-party neutrals within an ADR forum.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The 
Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 85 (2002) 
(describing the need for the Ethics 2000 Commission to create rules for attorneys as third-party 
neutrals).  One of the overarching goals of the Ethics 2000 Commission was to update the rules to 
adapt “to the realities of modern law practice and the limits of professional discipline.”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preface (2002). 
 116. Yarn, supra note 115, at 245 (noting that the crafting of these rules was difficult given the 
“competing philosophies, paradigms, or visions of what an ADR attorney’s behavior should be”). 
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was to define a previously undefined term: “tribunal.”  Under the 
revisions, a tribunal includes “a court, an arbitrator in a binding 
arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or 
other body acting in an adjudicative capacity.”117  The Reporter’s 
explanation for the new definition of tribunal is the following: “This term 
was not previously defined.  The Commission recommends including a 
definition and including not only courts but also binding arbitration and 
legislative bodies, administrative agencies or other bodies acting in an 
adjudicative capacity.”118  For the states adopting this definition, any 
portion of the ethical rules referencing a tribunal now applies to 
arbitration—or at least binding arbitration.  For the states that have not 
adopted this definition, whether the ethics rules referencing tribunal—
including the truthfulness rules—apply to arbitration at all is unclear.119 
The Ethics 2000 Commission used the new definition to delineate 
the types of behavior appropriate before a tribunal.120  One of the key 
issues before the Commission was the issue of truthfulness toward a 
tribunal.121  The final text of Rule 3.3, dealing with “Candor Toward the 
Tribunal,” reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
                                                          
 117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2002) (emphasis added).  “Tribunal” also 
includes courts, legislative bodies, agencies, and any “other body acting in an adjudicative capacity.”  
Yarn notes that one of the reasons why arbitration was included within the definition of the word 
tribunal is because “[a]lthough arbitral bodies are often referred to as ‘tribunals’ and are adjudicative 
in nature, their inclusion [was] uncertain.”  Yarn, supra note 115, at 255.  One criticism of this 
change is the fact that only binding and adjudicative forums fall within this rule.  The rule does not 
extend to the mediation forum or other non-binding forms of ADR.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra 
note 115, at 95 (“In mediations and non-binding arbitrations there are no obligations to volunteer 
information or to correct misinformation by other parties or lawyers in the proceedings unless the 
duty is imposed by other law, such as state fraud law or rules of civil procedure.”). 
 118. Model Rule 1.0: Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule10rem.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2012). 
 119. Charts Comparing Professional Conduct Rules, ABA, http://www.americabar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/policy/charts.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
 120. Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and Parlor Tricks, 
34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 3, 6 (2002) (“Overzealous lawyers may not honor their duty of candor to 
tribunals before which they appear.  This sometimes takes the form of a lawyer’s failure to disclose 
controlling legal authority directly adverse to his client’s position.  A lawyer may make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal, or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
misleading or false.”). 
 121. See David W. Raack, The Ethics 2000 Commission’s Proposed Revision of the Model 
Rules: Substantive Change or Just a Makeover?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 233, 253 (2001) (“A 
perennial issue in legal ethics concerns a lawyer’s responsibilities to a court or tribunal when the 
lawyer learns of client perjury or fraud on the tribunal.”). 
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 (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to 
the tribunal by the lawyer; 
 (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the 
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or 
 (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the 
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered 
material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer 
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal 
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and 
who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged 
in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take 
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the 
tribunal.122 
Thus, under Rule 3.3, in conjunction with the new definition of 
tribunal, a lawyer is prohibited from making false statements and from 
knowingly entering the false statements of others into evidence before an 
arbitral tribunal.  The states that have not yet adopted this definition of 
tribunal should do so in order to clear up any ambiguities about the 
application of these ethical rules.123 
B. Although Document Tampering Laws Do Not Apply to Arbitral
Proceedings, Common Law Claims and Presumptions Do Apply, in
Addition to Attorney Ethics Rules 
This section considers the laws regarding tampering and 
destruction—also called spoliation—of physical and documentary 
evidence.  The first subsection considers the criminal laws for tampering, 
which—like the perjury laws—generally do not apply to arbitration.  The 
second section considers common law causes of action for tampering and 
spoliation, and how those rules apply to arbitration.  The third section 
considers how arbitrators apply spoliation rules within their hearings 
                                                          
 122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a), (b) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 123. One criticism of dealing with the problem of lying in arbitration through the ethical rules is 
the fact that attorney discipline alone may be an unsatisfying remedy for a wronged arbitration party. 
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(and they are!).  Finally, this section considers how attorney ethics rules 
prevent this type of behavior from occurring in the arbitral forum. 
1. Criminal Tampering Laws, Like Perjury Laws, Largely Do Not
Apply to Arbitration 
Evidence before an arbitral tribunal, like at trial, includes both 
testimonial evidence and documentary evidence.  While the perjury laws 
apply to testimonial evidence, they do not extend to physical evidence or 
documents.  Physical evidence and document tampering statutes 
criminalize the destruction, alteration, and concealment of documents or 
other physical evidence that could be used in an action, such as a trial.124  
Just as with the perjury laws,125 the MPC has a model statute that many 
states have adopted.  MPC section 241.7 provides: 
A person commits a misdemeanor if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(a) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing 
with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(b) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to 
be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in such proceeding or investigation.126 
Again, just like with the perjury statutes, the tampering statute 
references an “official proceeding.”127  The same definition of “official 
proceeding” that applies to perjury laws and nowhere mentions 
arbitration, seemingly excluding the process, also applies to tampering 
laws.128 
The following states have a similar tampering statute that references 
“official proceedings”: Alabama,129 Alaska,130 Arizona,131 Arkansas,132 
                                                          
 124. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (criminalizing 
tampering with physical evidence if believing “an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted”). 
 125. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7; see, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/31-4 (West 2010); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.32 (West 2006). 
 127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7. 
 128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.0(4) (Official Proposed Draft 1962); see supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 129. ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (2006). 
 130. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.56.610 (West 2007). 
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Colorado,133 Connecticut,134 Delaware,135 the District of Columbia,136 
Hawaii,137 Idaho,138 Kentucky,139 Michigan,140 Mississippi,141 
Montana,142 Nebraska,143 New Hampshire,144 New Jersey,145 New 
York,146 North Dakota,147 Ohio,148 Oklahoma,149 Oregon,150 
Pennsylvania,151 South Dakota,152 Tennessee,153 Texas,154 Utah,155 and 
Washington.156  Considerably more uniformity exists among the states as 
to document tampering statutes than as to perjury statutes.157  
Unfortunately, the effect of this uniformity is that these tampering laws  
 
                                                                                                                       
 131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2809 (2006). 
 132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (West 2008). 
 133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-610 (West 2004). 
 134. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-155 (West 2007). 
 135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1269 (West 2010). 
 136. D.C. CODE. § 22-723 (Supp. 2011). 
 137. HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1076 (West 2008). 
 138. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2603 (West 2006) (referencing “any . . . proceeding . . . authorized 
by law”). 
 139. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.100 (West 2006). 
 140. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.483a(5) (West 2004). 
 141. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-125 (West 2011). 
 142. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-207 (2011). 
 143. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-922 (2009). 
 144. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:6 (2007). 
 145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-6 (West 2005). 
 146. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 2010). 
 147. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-09-03 (West 2008).  Interestingly, the North Dakota statute 
also applies when an individual believes “process, demand, or order has been issued or is about to be 
issued.”  Id.  The definition of “process, demand, or order” potentially applies to arbitration.  The 
terms mean “process, demand, or order authorized by law for the seizure, production, copying, 
discovery, or examination of a record, document, or thing.”  Id. 
 148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2006). 
 149. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 454 (West 2002) (covering tampering where an individual 
knows evidence is about to be produced in any “proceeding . . . authorized by law”). 
 150. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162.295 (West 2003). 
 151. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4910 (West 1983). 
 152. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-7-14 (2004).  South Dakota only uses the term “proceeding” and 
not “official proceeding,” which might more easily extend to arbitration. 
 153. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-503 (West 2011). 
 154. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (West 2011). 
 155. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-510.5 (West 2004).  In this statute, Utah defines the term “official 
proceeding” to include any “civil or administrative action, trial, examination under oath, 
administrative proceeding, or other civil or administrative adjudicative process.”  Id.  This definition 
of “official proceeding” is broader than the definition found in the MPC and could arguably include 
arbitration under the “examination under oath” catch-all. 
 156. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.150 (West 2009). 
 157. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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do not apply to the arbitral forum given the limiting definition of the key 
term “official proceeding.” 
The benefit of this uniformity is the relative ease of a uniform 
change to extend tampering laws to the arbitral forum.  Revising the 
MPC definition of “official proceeding” to include arbitration would 
make the MPC tampering law equally applicable to arbitration as to the 
litigation forum.  After revising the MPC, the states could consider the 
revisions and make the appropriate changes to their own criminal law.  
For reasons discussed in subsequent sections, every state should update 
its law to include arbitration within the ambit of these criminal laws. 
2. It Is an Open Question Whether a Common Law Cause of Action for
Spoliation Applies to Arbitration 
Some states recognize a common law cause of action in tort for 
damages suffered by virtue of one party’s document destruction.158  A 
minority of jurisdictions allow the party who should have received 
certain discovery to bring a cause of action against the party who 
negligently or intentionally destroyed the evidence.159  This cause of 
action can be maintained either as a separate lawsuit or as a claim within 
the underlying litigation.160 
                                                          
 158. Cecelia Hallinan, Comment, Balancing the Scales After Evidence Is Spoiled: Does 
Pennsylvania’s Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party?, 44 VILL. L. REV. 947, 956 (1999) 
(“A minority of states have determined that traditional remedies are inadequate because although 
they serve a punitive function, they do not fully compensate the spoliation victim.  Furthermore, 
traditional remedies fail to address the situation where a third party uninvolved in the litigation 
destroys the evidence. Consequently, these states have recognized a new tort cause of action that 
allows the injured party to bring an action against the spoliator for damages caused by evidence 
destruction.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 958.  Some jurisdictions require that the underlying lawsuit be complete before 
bringing a cause of action for spoliation of evidence.  Id.  For states employing this type of timing, 
the reason is likely because the cause of action would not accrue without knowing the outcome of 
the underlying action.  In other words, a plaintiff cannot prove the harm without first losing the 
underlying case. 
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The states of Alaska,161 Kansas,162 Ohio,163 Illinois,164 Indiana,165 
Louisiana,166 Montana,167 New Mexico,168 West Virginia,169 and New 
Jersey170 recognize the tort, as does the District of Columbia.171  A 
plaintiff in these states establishes the tort by showing: (1) the existence 
of a potential civil action; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the potential 
action; (3) destruction of evidence; (4) intent; (5) inability to prove the 
original claim, i.e., proximate cause; and (6) damages.172  A limited 
number of jurisdictions recognize a tort for both intentional and negligent 
spoliation of evidence.173  Negligent spoliation of evidence involves the 
same test, substituting the requirement of “intent” with the requirement 
of a duty between the parties to preserve the evidence.174 
Whether this common law cause of action applies to arbitration turns 
on the definition of a “civil action.”  The courts have yet to decide this 
issue.175  Perhaps parties within arbitration could argue that a civil action 
                                                          
 161. Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300, 303 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing tort of 
intentional spoliation of evidence). 
 162. Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kan. 1992). 
 163. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993). 
 164. Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 336 (Ill. 2004) (establishing the tort of negligent 
spoliation of evidence as a cause of action). 
 165. Glotzbach v. Froman, 827 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (establishing a cause of 
action for both intentional and negligent spoliation, but only if a duty exists between the parties), 
vacated, 854 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 2006). 
 166. Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La. Ct. App. 2004) 
(recognizing a tort of intentional spoliation). 
 167. Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc., 962 P.2d 1205 (Mont. 1998). 
 168. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 190 (N.M. 1995) (recognizing intentional 
spoliation of evidence as a cause of action), rev’d on other grounds, 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001). 
 169. Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569–70 (W. Va. 2003). 
 170. Manorcare Health Servs., Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 764 A.2d 475, 482 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting that destruction of evidence could result in a separate tort for 
spoliation, discovery sanctions, or an adverse inference jurisdiction). 
 171. See Hallinan, supra note 158, at 958; see also Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 
846, 854 (D.C. 1998); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 422-23 (Idaho 1996) 
(holding that even if Idaho did recognize the tort, the plaintiffs had not proven the elements). 
 172. Hallinan, supra note 158, at 958; see also supra notes 161–71. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co. Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing the 
tort of negligent spoliation, provided that the parties have a special relationship). 
 175. Some courts require the arbitration of spoliation claims if such claims fall within the 
arbitration agreement between the parties.  See, e.g., Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Sullivan, Higgins & 
Brion, PPE LLC, No. 08-162-KI2008 WL 2116908, at *3 (D. Or. May 14, 2008) (compelling a case 
to arbitration and requiring the arbitrator to deal with potential spoliation claim); Positive Software 
Solutions Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 561, 562 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (sending 
the spoliation claim to arbitration, confident that the arbitrator would take the claim very seriously); 
Dantz v. Apple Ohio LLC, 277 F. Supp. 2d 794, 805 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (compelling a case to 
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extends to arbitration.  Some evidence exists that arbitrators have been 
asked for an award based on spoliation of evidence.176  Until arbitrators 
begin to award damages for spoliation of evidence and those awards are 
challenged in court, this question remains open. 
3. An Arbitrator May Apply Burden-Shifting Penalties and Sanctions in
the Arbitral Forum 
In addition to the possible criminal liability for destroying documents 
and civil liability in a cause of action for spoliation,177 if a litigant alleges 
spoliation in the original case, then that party may be eligible to receive a 
burden-shifting inference in that party’s favor.  The victim of spoliation 
may also be eligible to receive sanctions from the offending party in the 
form of attorney’s fees or other monetary sanctions.  Nearly every state 
in the United States allows for some form of sanctions against the 
spoliating party in a civil case.178 
                                                                                                                       
arbitration that included a potential claim for spoliation). 
 176. Some arbitral opinions evince that parties have asked for damages for a cause of action for 
spoliation.  For instance, a pair of cases before the National Association of Securities Dealers 
involved denied claims for spoliation of evidence based on the merits of the claim, rather than the 
inability of the claimants to recover under the cause of action.  See Parsons v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., No. 98-01744, 1999 WL 681721, at *2 (N.A.S.D. July 8, 1999) (describing claimants’ 
requesting damages for lost income, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, 
pre-judgment interest, and further relief the panel deems proper); Rose v. Lehwald Orosey Pepe, 
Inc., No. 96-02274, 1998 WL 1178726, at *2 (N.A.S.D. Aug. 5, 1998) (describing claimants’ 
requesting a reward against respondents for reinstatement, back-pay interest, front pay, 
compensatory and punitive damages, costs, attorney’s fees, accounting fees, expert witness fees, and 
other relief the panel deems proper). 
 177. See supra Parts III.B.1–2. 
 178. See, e.g., Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000) (awarding an adverse 
inference and monetary sanctions); Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1997) (recognizing availability of varying sanctions depending on the severity of the 
spoliation); Tomlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 57, 62–63 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (adverse 
inference); Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 517 (Cal. 1998) (adverse 
inference, sanctions, disciplinary action, or criminal action); Pfantz v. Kmart Corp., 85 P.3d 564, 569 
(Colo. App., 2003) (adverse inference); Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832–33 
(Conn. 1996) (adverse inference); Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1998) (adverse inference); Public Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 
599 (Fla. 1987) (burden shifting); Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1996) (adverse inference, dismissal, or exclusion of evidence); Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 
87 P.3d 930, 933 (Idaho 2003) (adverse inference); Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Iowa 
2003) (adverse inference); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997) (adverse 
inference, monetary sanctions); Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 3 (La. Ct. App. 
2000) (adverse inference); Driggin v. Am. Sec. Alarm Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 (D. Me. 2000) 
(adverse inference, dismissal, monetary sanctions); Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d 150, 155 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App., 1997) (adverse inference); Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521, 534 (Mass. 
2003) (adverse inference, exclusion of evidence, dismissal); Trupiano v. Cully, 84 N.W.2d 747, 748 
 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 951 
Unlike the tort of spoliation of evidence, some anecdotal evidence 
suggests that arbitrators are, in fact, granting this burden-shifting 
inference and sanctions in the arbitral forum.  For example, in Jones v. 
PPG Industries, Inc. the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
confirmation of an arbitral award in which the arbitrator found for a 
defendant company despite employing an inference against the defendant 
because of missing file documents.179  In Jones, the plaintiff–employee in 
a discrimination case argued that the lack of production of e-mail and 
other communications meant that such communications and documents 
had been destroyed.180  The arbitrator largely disagreed181 but found that 
an investigatory file did exist and was missing at the time of 
arbitration.182  The arbitrator applied an adverse inference with respect to 
this missing file but still found for the defendant.183  The arbitrator 
concluded that, even with the inference, “given the record evidence 
adduced at the hearing, [the plaintiff] had not demonstrated unlawful 
                                                                                                                       
(Mich. 1957) (adverse inference); Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995) 
(adverse inference); Tolbert v. State, 511 So. 2d 1368, 1372–73 (Miss. 1987) (adverse inference); 
Baldrige v. Dir. of Revenue, 82 S.W.3d 212, 222–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (adverse inference); State 
v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 648 (Neb. 2002) (adverse inference); Reingold v. Wet ‘N Wild Nev., 
Inc., 944 P.2d 800, 802 (Nev. 1997) (adverse inference), overruled by Bass-Davos v. Davis, 134 
P.3d 103, 109 (Nev. 2006); Rodriguez v. Webb, 680 A.2d 604, 606–07 (N.H. 1996) (adverse 
inference); Swick v. N.Y. Times Co., 815 A.2d 508, 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (adverse 
inference, monetary sanctions); Segura v. K-Mart Corp., 62 P.3d 283, 286–87 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) 
(adverse inference, dismissal); Amaris v. Sharp Elecs., 758 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003) (dismissal or lesser sanction); McLain v. Taco Bell Corp., 527 S.E.2d 712, 715 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2000) (adverse inference); Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 544 N.W.2d 122, 124 (N.D. 1996) 
(dismissal, preclusion of evidence, adverse inference); Barker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01AP-
658, 2001 WL 1661961, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2001) (adverse inference, discovery 
sanctions); Manpower, Inc. v. Brawdy, 62 P.3d 391, 392 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (adverse inference); 
Mead v. Papa Razzi Rest., 840 A.2d 1103, 1108 (R.I. 2004) (adverse inference); Wis. Motor Corp. v. 
Green, 79 S.E.2d 718, 720–21 (S.C. 1954) (adverse inference); Cody v. Leapley, 476 N.W.2d 257, 
264 (S.D. 1991) (adverse inference); Foley v. St. Thomas Hosp., 906 S.W.2d 448, 453–54 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1995) (adverse inference); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1998) (adverse 
inference); Lavalette v. Noyes, 205 A.2d 413, 415 (Vt. 1964) (“presumption of falsity”); Jacobs v. 
Jacobs, 237 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Va. 1977) (adverse inference); Pier 67, Inc. v. King Cnty., 573 P.2d 2, 
6 (Wash. 1977) (adverse inference); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 566–68 (W. Va. 2003) 
(sanctions, adverse inference, tort claim in some circumstances); Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 
211 N.W.2d 810, 821 (Wis. 1973) (adverse inference, sanctions); Abraham v. Great W. Energy, 
LLC, 101 P.3d 446, 455 (Wyo. 2004) (adverse inference). 
 179. 393 F. App’x 869, 870–71 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 180. Id. at 870.  The plaintiff, however, could not demonstrate that the e-mail messages ever 
existed and only surmised that such messages should have existed and that their absence indicated 
that the corporation deliberately destroyed evidence helpful to his case.  Id. 
 181. Id. at 871. 
 182. Id. at 870–71. 
 183. Id. 
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discrimination or retaliation.”184  The plaintiff then moved to vacate 
under manifest disregard.185  The district court denied the plaintiff’s 
motion and the Third Circuit affirmed.186  Given the scope of the arbitral 
hearing and the well-reasoned opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed the 
finding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers.187 
In some cases, the arbitrator uses the evidence of spoliation to figure 
a damages award.  For instance, in Davis v. Reliance Electric Industrial 
Co., a Tennessee court confirmed an award of compensatory and 
punitive damages to a former employee in a retaliatory discharge case 
involving lost or destroyed critical documentary evidence.188  The 
plaintiff incurred two work-related injuries, and his employer fired him 
for excessive absenteeism.189  The plaintiff alleged he was fired for 
seeking workers compensation benefits.190  During the course of the case, 
the employer–defendant failed to produce an important performance 
evaluation and attendance record.191  The arbitrator was troubled by the 
missing documents, stating that “it was ‘beyond belief’ that the 
documents could be ‘missing’ when they were absolutely crucial to the 
defense.”192  Ultimately, the arbitrator awarded compensatory damages, 
emotional distress damages, and punitive damages of $525,000 based on 
the defendant’s net worth.193  The arbitrator awarded the punitive 
damages, in part, because of the defendant’s destruction of evidence.194  
The Tennessee trial court confirmed the award, and the defendant 
appealed.195  In particular, the defendant claimed that the arbitrator  
 
                                                          
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 871. 
 187. Id.  The court noted that the party “seeking to vacate an arbitration award must clear a ‘high 
hurdle’” to meet the requisite burden of proof.  Id. at 870 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010)). 
 188. 104 S.W.3d 57, 58–59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 58. 
 191. Id. at 59 (“The arbitrator found that he could not rely in any way on the missing 
performance evaluation and attendance record.”). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 59–60. 
 194. Id. at 63. 
 195. Id. at 60. 
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exceeded his powers by awarding punitive damages.196  The court 
rejected the argument out of hand, finding no such abuse of power.197 
The case of AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Oxford 
Management Services involved an arbitrator dismissing a claim as a 
sanction for spoliated evidence.198  The parties entered into an agreement 
that the defendant–collections company would “perform collection 
activities” on plaintiff’s delinquent accounts receivable.199  Later, the 
plaintiff notified defendant of its termination of the agreement but soon 
discovered that the defendant had continued to collect on the delinquent 
accounts. 200  When the parties could not resolve the dispute, the plaintiff 
filed a demand for arbitration pursuant to the contract.201  The defendant 
counterclaimed for funds allegedly owed to it, and the plaintiff moved to 
dismiss “based upon the spoliation of evidence,” including relevant 
financial records.202  The arbitrator granted the plaintiff’s motion, finding 
that the defendant “‘knowingly destroyed records necessary to resolve 
the disputes between the parties.’”203 
The arbitrator thereafter awarded the plaintiff monetary damages in 
the amount of nearly $450,000, and the plaintiff moved the federal court 
to confirm the award.204  The defendant, unsurprisingly, moved to 
vacate.205  The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the arbitrator 
                                                          
 196. Id. at 63 (“Defendant similarly argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding 
punitive damages without using the magic  language ‘clear and convincing evidence’ in his 
Memorandum Opinion.”). 
 197. Id. at 64. 
 198. 627 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  As noted in more detail below, the plaintiff sought 
to confirm the award while the defendant sought to vacate it.  The defendant relied on two standards 
of vacatur: “exceeding his powers” under FAA § 10(a)(4), and “manifest disregard of the law.”  In 
discussing the appropriate standard of review, the court used the potentially broadest “manifest 
disregard” standard for vacatur, but still found the defendant’s arguments for vacatur to be without 
merit.  Id. at 94 (holding that the court “finds each of defendant’s arguments, including its claim of 
‘manifest disregard of the law,’ to be without merit.”). 
 199. Id. at 89. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 90 (“On December 14, 2006, [the plaintiff] filed a Demand for Arbitration (the 
‘Demand’), against [the defendant] with the AAA, seeking the recovery of monies due and owing 
under the [agreement].”). 
 202. Id. at 90–91.  The plaintiff relied on New York spoliation law in its motion.  Id. at 90.  
Under New York law, if a party “wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to 
have been disclosed,” the court has the power to dismiss “the action or any part thereof.”  Id. at 90 
n.3 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3126(3) (McKinney 1993)). 
 203. Id. at 91 (citing the arbitrator’s findings).  Note that the rule upon which the arbitrator relied 
specifically applied to “courts” and did not have any binding application on arbitrators.  Id. at 90 & 
n.3. 
 204. Id. at 91. 
 205. Id. 
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exceeded his powers in dismissing the counterclaim.206  The court found 
that the arbitrator had the power to resolve the matter presented in the 
counterclaim under the broad arbitration clause and that dismissing the 
counterclaim did not constitute prohibited “punitive or exemplary 
damages” as those terms were used in the arbitration agreement.207  The 
court noted that the dismissal could have been considered a penalty 
either for document destruction or for failure to bring competent 
evidence to support the claim, and it found that the arbitrator’s decision 
could be upheld on either ground because “evidence necessary to the 
action was destroyed by defendant and . . . the spoliation of evidence was 
fatal to deciding defendant’s counterclaim.”208  Ultimately, “dismissal 
was not prohibited by the [agreement to arbitrate].”209 
As these cases demonstrate, arbitrators have some liberty in 
awarding sanctions where parties engage in bad behavior in the arbitral 
forum.  This type of discretion, however, is not based on any type of 
established rule, but it is based only on the arbitrators’ assessment of 
equity in the given case.  In fact, the arbitrators in the previous cases 
never pointed to directly applicable statutory or other authority in 
determining whether to award sanctions, instead drawing analogies to the 
litigation context.210  Having more explicit criminal rules211 would give 
arbitrators increased justification for their awards of sanctions in these 
types of situations. 
4. Attorney Ethics Rules on Spoliation and Document Preservation
Apply to Arbitration in the Same Manner as Ethics Rules on
Truthfulness 
In addition to having attorney ethics rules that deal with truthfulness 
toward the tribunal,212 other ethics rules deal with truthfulness toward an 
                                                          
 206. Id. at 94–96. 
 207. Id. at 96. 
 208. Id. at 95–96. 
 209. Id. (“Regardless of whether the arbitrator dismissed defendant’s counterclaim on the merits 
or as a procedural matter, that decision is within his broad grant of authority under the [arbitration 
agreement].  Therefore, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in dismissing defendant’s 
counterclaim.”).  The district court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the arbitrator violated 
its due process rights in dismissing the counterclaim prior to the hearing.  Id. at 97. 
 210. See, e.g., case cited supra notes 203–04. 
 211. In addition, evidentiary and sanctions rules could be addressed in states’ Civil Rules of 
Procedure or in the Rules of Evidence. 
 212. See supra Part III.A.2. 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 955 
opposing counsel and client.213  The Model Rules’ provisions dealing 
with preservation of evidence also apply to arbitration. 
The Model Rules broadly prohibit any destruction or concealment of 
“evidence” without any reference to the forum in which the evidence is 
used.214  Model Rule 3.4 prohibits an attorney from “unlawfully 
obstruct[ing] another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter[ing], 
destroy[ing] or conceal[ing] a document or other material having 
potential evidentiary value.  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another 
person to do any such act.”215  Without any limiting language, this rule 
applies to the arbitral forum because cases in arbitration—like 
litigation—are decided on evidence.  The American Law Institute’s(ALI) 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers has a similarly 
broad rule regarding falsifying and destroying evidence.216 
As with the perjury statutes, the vast majority of states adopted an 
evidence-tampering ethical rule.217  Given the breadth of the rule—
providing no limitation to a particular forum—it should apply to 
arbitration just as it applies to litigation.  Accordingly, none of these 
ethical rules governing truthfulness need the revisions previously 
suggested or any other revisions in order to apply to arbitration. 
C. States Should Amend Their Criminal Laws and Ethics Rules to Make
Them Applicable to Arbitration 
This Article advocates the expansion of the criminal rules for perjury 
and tampering, as well as the attorney ethics rules, so these laws apply to 
the arbitral forum.  Specifically, this Article advocates that the term 
“official proceeding” in the MPC and similar state laws include the term 
                                                          
 213. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2002). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers has a very simple rule regarding 
document destruction: “(1) A lawyer may not falsify documentary or other evidence.  (2) A lawyer 
may not destroy or obstruct another party’s access to documentary or other evidence when doing so 
would violate a court order or other legal requirements, or counsel or assist a client to do so.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 (2000).  Again, this rule speaks of 
“evidence” broadly, so the rule facially applies to the arbitral forum; however, one of the official 
comments notes that evidence is usually that which may be relevant in “an official proceeding,” 
without elaborating on the definition of the term.  Id. § 118 cmt. a. 
 217. See supra notes 113, 119 and accompanying text.  The California rule is similar, but not 
exactly the same as the Model Rule; it reads: “A member shall not suppress any evidence that the 
member or the member’s client has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce.”  CAL. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-220 (2010).  As with the Model Rules, this rule deals with evidence generally 
without reference to any specific application to a tribunal. 
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“binding arbitration” within the definition.  Prior sections discuss how 
the states could make those changes, noting some of the language that 
would successfully expand those statutes to arbitration.  This section 
considers the policies supporting the recommended changes.218 
The first subsection discusses the changing nature of arbitration and 
the types of cases now resolved in arbitration.  The second subsection 
considers arbitration’s status as a “quasi-judicial” forum and the 
application of judicial rules to the quasi-judicial forum.  The third 
subsection considers the effect of immunity in the arbitral forum and 
how the extension of the criminal statues would close a current gap in the 
law dealing with repercussions for lying in arbitration.  The fourth 
section considers the implications of due process requirements.  Finally, 
the fifth section considers the implications of limited judicial review of 
arbitral awards, especially review for fraud. 
1. Arbitration Is Considerably More Pervasive and Deals with
Considerably More Legal Issues Today than at the Time of the 
Model Rules’ Drafting 
At the time of the drafting of the original MPC, arbitration’s use was 
considerably more limited than today and dealt primarily with factual 
disputes between business parties.219  Today, parties use arbitration to 
resolve disputes in a wide variety of contexts, including the consumer 
and employment contexts.220  In addition, parties now ask arbitrators to 
consider a broad range of legal issues, including securities violations, 
antitrust allegations, discrimination claims, constitutional law claims, and 
                                                          
 218. See supra Parts III.A–B. 
 219. See Donald R. Philbin, Jr., Litigators Needed to Advise Transaction Lawyers On Litigation 
Prenups, 56 ADVOCATE, Fall 2011, at 36–37. 
 220. Id. at 37 (“This national policy favoring arbitration later extended into statutory claims, 
including Truth in Lending, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, securities, and anti-trust.  It has 
also been held to cover fraudulent inducement, tortious interference and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, defamation and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, breach of fiduciary 
duty and conversion, personal injury/wrongful death, and wrongful discharge (Sabine Pilot).  
‘Employment arbitration grew dramatically in the wake of the Court’s 1991 Gilmer decision.’ . . . So 
arbitration is included in a wider variety of contracts than at any time, and, yet, it has ‘never been 
subject to wider criticism.’” (citations omitted)); Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due 
Process and Other Constitutional Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2011) (“Arbitration is so 
prevalent that one can find arbitration agreements in many different types of contracts involving 
consumer goods, employment, bank deposits, credit cards, and a whole host of other arrangements.  
Frequently, businesses place non-negotiable arbitration agreements in their consumer and 
employment contracts, thereby, creating a mandatory arbitration system for disputes arising under 
such contracts.” (footnote omitted)). 
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class action certifications, to name just a few.221  The drafters of the MPC 
and the legislatures adopting perjury and tampering statutes in the 1960s 
and 1970s222 likely did not consider whether these statues would be 
applicable to arbitration.  The ALI has not released a new draft of the 
MPC in thirty years.223  Arbitration, however, has changed significantly 
                                                          
 221. See Philbin, supra note 219, at 37.  When Congress passed the FAA in 1925, it likely did 
not intend the Act to extend to these kinds of disputes.  Justice Black, in his dissent in Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., stated the following about Congress’ intent: 
[I]t is clear to me from the bill’s sponsors’ understanding of the function of arbitration 
that they never intended that the issue of fraud in the inducement be resolved by 
arbitration.  They recognized two special values of arbitration: (1) the expertise of an 
arbitrator to decide factual questions in regard to the day-to-day performance of 
contractual obligations, and (2) the speed with which arbitration, as contrasted to 
litigation, could resolve disputes over performance of contracts and thus mitigate the 
damages and allow the parties to continue performance under the contracts.  Arbitration 
serves neither of these functions where a contract is sought to be rescinded on the ground 
of fraud. 
388 U.S. 395, 415 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
Over the last several decades, the Supreme Court’s arbitrability case law clearly establishes 
that disputes under most statutes can be arbitrated.  The only exception to this rule is if Congress 
specifically excludes arbitration as a dispute-resolution forum within the statute or its legislative 
history.  Very recently, the Supreme Court decided CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, which further 
upholds support for the arbitrability of statutory claims.  132 S. Ct 665 (2012).  CompuCredit 
involves a class action claim by consumers under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) for 
alleged misrepresentations made to them regarding the available credit limits under certain credit 
cards and the fees associated with those cards.  Id. at 668.  The CROA requires that creditors give 
certain notices to cardholders, one of which states that the cardholders have a “right to sue a credit 
repair organization.”  Id. at 669 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006)).  The act also has a non-
waiver provision, meaning that any attempt by the credit repair organization to waive the protections 
of the statute would be void.  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a) (2006)).  In Compucredit, the plaintiffs 
received the requisite disclosure, but the contracts also had arbitration agreements.  Id. at 668. 
The question for the Court was whether the arbitration agreement constituted a waiver of the 
“right to sue” provision, thus voiding the contractual requirement to arbitrate.  Id.  Unsurprisingly, 
the Court found the claim arbitrable and found that the requirements under the CROA are to provide 
a congressionally written notice to consumers, and nothing more.  Id. at 672.  Just as in the long line 
of cases culminating with Gilmer, the Court examined the legislation at issue to determine whether 
Congress intended to preclude the waiver of the judicial forum in cases falling under the statute.  Id. 
at 670–71(discussing Gilmer, McMahon, and Mitsubishi).  The Court found nothing in the text of the 
CROA that would guarantee a judicial forum but only that the power to impose liability (be it in a 
specific court or in arbitration) be preserved.  Id. at 671–72.  If Congress had intended to provide a 
judicial forum, the Court reasoned that the legislation should have specifically stated that arbitration 
of such statutory claims not be allowed.  Id. at 672.  Because Congress was not so specific, then the 
arbitration of such claims is not prohibited.  Id. 
 222. MODEL PENAL CODE Forward (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985). 
 223. The ALI is currently revising the sections of the MPC dealing with sentencing in order to 
reflect the “many changes in sentencing philosophy and practice that have taken place in the more 
than 40 years since the Code was first developed.”  Current Projects, Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=2 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2012).  Other commentators have suggested changes in the MPC sections for 
perjury and tampering laws in general, other than in the arbitration context.  See Anthony M. Dillof, 
Modal Retributivism: A Theory of Sanctions for Attempts and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. 
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during the intervening years.  Now would be a good time to revisit these 
statutes and make them explicitly applicable to the arbitral forum. 
In 1962, arbitration applied primarily to factual disputes between 
businesses.224  Arbitration was not used in the employment or the 
consumer contexts, and arbitrators were not asked to decide legal 
disputes.225  The leading Supreme Court case at the time, Wilko v. Swan, 
held that statutory claims were inappropriate for resolution by 
arbitration—at least in the context of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.226  
The Wilko case involved a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate disputes 
falling under the Securities Act of 1933.227  The customer claimed that 
the seller made misrepresentations as to the value of certain securities.228  
The Securities Act provided for a judicial forum for dispute resolution 
and an “anti-waiver” provision that would invalidate contrary provisions 
in a contract.229  The Court held that statutory claims were not arbitrable 
for two reasons.230  First, “the right to select the judicial forum . . . [could 
not] be waived under . . . the Securities Act.”231  Second, the Court 
expressed serious concern about whether arbitrators could protect  
 
                                                                                                                       
L. REV. 647, 685 (2011) (arguing that the punishment for perjury should be “de minimis” if the 
perjured testimony does not lead to an erroneous verdict); Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest 
About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133 (2008) (detailing the ethical obligations of 
attorneys, including the opposing obligations of client confidentiality and candor towards the 
courts); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. 
L. REV. 149, 194 (2009) (discussing concepts of recanting in domestic abuse cases and how the 
perjury laws should react to those instances); Susan E. Thrower, Neither Reasonable Nor Remedial: 
The Hopeless Contradictions of the Legal Ethics Measures to Prevent Perjury, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
781, 782–83 (2010) (requesting additional clarity from the ABA on the steps a lawyer must take 
when concerned that a client might commit perjury or has committed perjury); Watts, supra note 39, 
at 806–07 (arguing for a private qui tam cause of action against alleged perjurers; however, the text 
of the proposed Model Civil Perjury Act only applies for statements made “to any court of the 
United States”); Jerrold Abeles, Signed, Sealed & Delivered, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2002, at 35 
(advocating a change in California perjury laws in order to apply perjury laws to depositions, and 
problems with deposition transcripts that are not reviewed and signed). 
 224. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1635–37 (2005). 
 225. Id. 
 226. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 227. Id. at 429–30. 
 228. Id. at 428–29 (“Claiming that the loss was due to the firm’s misrepresentations and 
omission of information concerning Mr. Page, he sought damages.”). 
 229. Id. at 430–33, 435. 
 230. Id. at 438. 
 231. Id. at 434–35. 
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consumers’ statutory rights.232  Although the Court ultimately overruled 
Wilko, it did not do so until 1989.233 
By 1991, the Supreme Court had completely shifted its policy on the 
arbitrability of statutory claims.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 
remains the leading case discussing how the arbitral forum can 
adequately protect statutory rights.234  The Gilmer court held that an 
individual employee’s claims under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) were subject to arbitration under a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause.235  The Court rejected the plaintiff–employee’s 
contention that the ADEA claim was non-arbitrable, noting: “It is by now 
clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, 
enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”236  The Court reasoned that it would 
uphold the parties’ freedom to contract unless Congress evinced an 
intention that parties be disallowed from arbitrating claims arising under 
a particular statute.237 
The Gilmer Court also clarified the statutory rights afforded by the 
ADEA and similar statutes.238  By the time of the Gilmer decision, the 
rights provided under the ADEA and other rights-based statutes 
constituted the underlying substantive rights—e.g., the right to a 
discrimination-free workplace—not the right to a judicial forum.239  In 
                                                          
 232. Id. at 435–36. 
 233. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  Following 
Wilko, the general consensus in the country was that statutory claims were not arbitrable.  See 
LeRoy, supra note 2, at 157–58 (2011) (discussing the holding in Wilko and noting the beginning of 
the “manifest disregard” standard articulated).  In 1987, the Court started to shift its view of the 
arbitration of statutory claims when it held that claims under the Exchange Act of 1934 were 
arbitrable.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 234. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 235. Id. at 23.  Again, just as in Wilko, the Gilmer case involves a “one-shot” player arbitrating a 
dispute against a “repeat player” arising under a pre-dispute arbitration clause.  See Cole & 
Blankley, supra note 21, at 321 (discussing briefly the historical treatment of “one-shot” and “repeat 
player” parties in the arbitration forum). 
 236. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 237. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985)).  Congress’s intent would need to be manifested either in the text of the substantive statute 
itself or within the legislative history for the statute.  Id.  Ultimately, these cases turn on which 
policy trumps—the freedom of contract expressed in the FAA or the judicial forum provided for in 
the substantive statute.  At the time of Wilko, the Court chose the latter.  346 U.S. 427, 434–35 
(1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  By 
the time of Gilmer, the Court clearly chooses the former.  500 U.S. at 23. 
 238. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.  Note, too, that these civil rights statutes at issue were all passed 
well after the 1925 passage of the FAA; some of these rights—such as the rights afforded under the 
ADA of 1990—arose after the promulgation of the Model Penal Code.  See id. at 23, 41–42 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 239. Id. at 28–29. 
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fact, the Gilmer Court went to great lengths to discuss the adequacy of 
the judicial forum at issue.240  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s many 
arguments about the adequacy of the arbitral forum, including arguments 
that the arbitrators might be biased, that he would be afforded inadequate 
discovery, that the potential to limit arbitral awards would be 
disadvantageous to individuals, and that the scope of available remedies 
might be different or more limited in arbitration.241  Since the time of 
Gilmer, “the Court’s holding has been widely applied to all kinds of 
claims, including other employment discrimination disputes.”242 
Given the changing nature of arbitration and claims subject to 
arbitration, now is a good time to rethink the application of perjury and 
tampering laws to the arbitral forum.  Especially now that important 
statutory rights are subject to arbitration, questions about the ethics 
afforded in the procedure should take increased precedence.  
Arbitration’s informality—admittedly a benefit of arbitration—should 
not be allowed to breed unethical behavior on the part of arbitration 
parties and attorneys.  Now, more than ever, the rules regarding ethics 
within the arbitral forum should be crystallized.  Extending the criminal 
tampering and perjury laws would go a long way toward promoting 
ethical behavior in the arbitral forum by arbitration participants. 
2. Arbitration Is Simply an Alternate Forum, Providing the Same 
Rights as a Court 
Part of the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the arbitral forum is 
related to the Court’s view that arbitration does not involve giving up 
rights, but rather, it provides an alternate forum in which rights—
statutory or otherwise—are vindicated.243  For parties of any kind to 
                                                          
 240. Id. at 30.  The plaintiff worked in the securities industry, and his employment agreement 
required arbitration under the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration rules.  Id. 
 241. Id. at 30–32. 
 242. See Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or Justice 
Denied?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 188 (2011).  The Gilmer Court specifically left open the 
possibility that Congress could change civil rights laws, or any other statute, to preclude arbitration 
of disputes falling within the statute.  To date, Congress has not responded in any significant way.  
In the more than twenty years since Gilmer, Congress has not amended Title VII, the ADA, the 
ADEA, or similar legislation to preclude arbitration thereunder. 
 243. The Gilmer Court specifically held: “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve 
both its remedial and deterrent function.”  500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)); see also Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create 
Moral Hazard? When Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 998, 
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adjudicate their rights, they must be guaranteed a forum with adequate 
assurances that the parties and the attorneys will tell the truth and act 
ethically.  In addition, repercussions must exist such that a person 
breaking these minimum standards of truth-telling and other ethical 
behavior could face criminal liability. 
If arbitration is merely a substitute forum, then what should that 
forum provide?  Surprisingly little has been written on the characteristics 
of this alternate forum as they relate to preservation of parties’ 
substantive rights.244  One of the rights on which some commentators 
have focused is the right of claimants to receive the same types of 
remedies available in court.245  Other commentators and courts focus on a 
party’s right to a neutral forum.246  Another of Gilmer’s hallmarks is the 
                                                                                                                       
1007–08 (2009) (“Gilmer states a theory of forum substitution.  Arbitrators serve as substitute 
judges.  The theory implies that when arbitrators determine that evidence supports a finding of 
employer liability, they should provide the relief that a judge would order.”); Gary Minda & Douglas 
Klein, The New Arbitral Paradigm in the Law of the Work: How the Proposed Employee Free 
Choice Act Reinforces Supreme Court Arbitration Decisions in Denying Free Choice in the 
Workplace, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 64 (“Gilmer, however, gave its approval to the arbitral 
forum as a substitute for the judicial forum only so long as the arbitral forum would allow the 
grievant to effectively vindicate his or her statutory claim.”).  But see Kenneth T. Lopatka, A Critical 
Perspective on the Interplay Between Our Federal Labor and Arbitration Laws, 63 S.C. L. REV. 43, 
69 (2011) (questioning whether the Gilmer distinction between forum and substance is workable 
beyond the “right not to be victimized by an employer’s discriminatory practices or conduct”). 
 244. But see Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty 
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165, 191 
(2005) (suggesting that limitations on damages in the arbitral forum runs afoul of Gilmer’s rule that 
the arbitral forum is simply a substitute forum and does not substitute substance of the underlying 
claims); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court Review of 
Punitive Awards in Labor and Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 199, 206 (2006) 
(suggesting that the limitations on punitive damages under the State Farm line of cases should 
presumably apply in the arbitral forum if the arbitral forum is truly a substitute forum).  One of the 
substantive rights not addressed in this Article is the right to a cost-efficient forum.  Unlike the 
litigation forum, with publicly paid employees, arbitrators are private employees who charge the 
parties by the hour.  If the claimant cannot vindicate rights—particularly statutory rights—in the 
arbitral forum because of cost concerns, then under Gilmer, the arbitration clause can be invalidated.  
See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–92 (2000) (requiring a claimant to prove 
that the arbitral forum is cost prohibitive); see also Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under 
Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative 
Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 497–98 (2009) 
(discussing the issue of “prohibitive costs” in vindicating rights). 
 245. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past 
Quarter Century, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 429 (2010) (“Nothing would seem more 
fundamental to Gilmer’s thesis that mandatory arbitration merely constitutes a change of forums and 
not a loss of substantive statutory rights than the principle that the arbitrator must be able to provide 
the same remedies as a court.”). 
 246. See, e.g., Steven M. Warshawsky, Gilmer, The Contractual Exhaustion Doctrine, and 
Federal Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, 19 LAB. LAW. 285, 298–99 (2004) (“[A valid 
compulsory arbitration] agreement cannot require the employee to waive access to a neutral forum in 
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presentation of facts—presumably untainted by perjury, fraud, or other 
corruption.247 
Applying perjury rules to the arbitral forum would extend to 
arbitration parties the same remedies that they would have in court and 
would help ensure that the forum remains fair.  Parties in litigation have 
the right to seek perjury or tampering charges, and extending these 
criminal laws to the arbitral forum would simply provide the same 
remedies to parties in arbitration that they would have in court.  In 
addition, perjury and tampering laws help ensure that the litigation forum 
remains a fair forum.  Extending these criminal sanctions to the arbitral 
forum would help make arbitration a fairer process, too. 
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court would go so far as to 
require the extension of perjury and tampering laws to the arbitral 
forum,248 the extension of the criminal law would certainly fall in line 
with Supreme Court precedent and provide additional support for 
legislatures to enact this type of legislation.  This Article advocates 
making this slight change to the criminal law not because the Supreme 
Court would require such a change but because such a change would 
make the arbitral forum fairer for those parties who have chosen to 
resolve disputes there. 
One possible criticism of this proposal might be that perjury charges 
are extraordinarily low and that this change would not make any real 
difference in the overall scheme of things.249  Often, prosecutors charge 
                                                                                                                       
which to enforce his or her rights.”); see also Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); Charles J. Coleman & Gerald C. Coleman, Toward a New Paradigm of Labor 
Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 65 (1995) (noting a requirement of 
arbitration when statutory rights are involved: “That there be fair and regular proceedings”). 
 247. Coleman & Coleman, supra note 246, at 65 (noting that Gilmer also requires “[t]hat there 
be presentation of facts” and that “[t]he facts relating to the public policy issue must be presented to 
the arbitrator and the issue considered and decided by the arbitrator”). 
 248.  
The Supreme Court had already recognized but found no concern with the informality of 
the arbitration process itself, which, as it noted, could ignore swearing witnesses, 
evidence rules, transcripts, and statements of the reasons for arbitrators’ determinations.  
In many areas the parties or the arbitration societies or sponsors had placed constraints on 
how the proceedings would be run to preserve notions of due process.  However, there 
was little to control excesses that might occur in a given case and no effective appeal 
without a rare finding of prejudice to the complaining party. 
John Kagel, Arbitration and Due Process: The Way We Were at the Time of Gilmer, 11 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 267, 298 (2007). 
 249. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1489–90 (2009) (noting that, while perjury charges are hard to quantify, sources 
indicate that as little as 0.2% of all federally filed felonies are perjury charges, and that perjury 
charges are more likely filed in high-profile cases or cases involving difficult issues other than the 
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defendants with crimes such as perjury or tampering in order to focus on 
high-profile cases or to charge someone with something that will 
“stick.”250  Whether or not a large number of people are prosecuted for 
perjury, the fact that these criminal laws remain on the books is a 
deterrent so that people testify truthfully at trial or under oath in an 
official proceeding.251  Indeed, the “principal purpose of the law of 
perjury and false swearing must therefore be the deterrence of 
falsifications.”252  Criminal law’s extension to the arbitral forum should 
act as a deterrent.253 
                                                                                                                       
process crimes).  Some commentators suggest that perjury rates are increasing, although not 
necessarily charges.  See Linda F. Harrison, The Law of Lying: The Difficulty of Pursuing Perjury 
Under the Federal Perjury Statutes, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 397, 422–23 (2003) (“Courts have 
recognized that ‘maximum deterrence of perjury is necessarily inconsistent with maximum range for 
recantation.’  However, the maximum deterrence of perjury is to compel truthfulness form the 
beginning.  Of what benefit is it to give a defendant the opportunity to lie when the government 
knows absolutely that it cannot succeed?” (quoting United States v. Moore, 613 1029, 1041 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979))); Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military 
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 681 n.191 (2002) (noting 
that perjury by police officers at suppression hearings is “all too common”); Alan Heinrich, Note, 
Clinton’s Little White Lies: The Materiality Requirement for Perjury in Civil Discovery, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1303, 1319 (1999) (“If it is true that perjury is rampant—a claim that it is no doubt 
impossible to prove—then the systematic under-enforcement of perjury undermines the deterrent 
effect of the offense.” (footnote omitted)); David Sweet, Note, Sacrifice, Atonement, and Legal 
Ethics, 113 YALE L.J. 219, 233 n.45 (2003) (“There is a general feeling that the rate of witness 
perjury is ever-increasing.”). 
 250. See Murphy, supra note 249, at 1437 (“What do Bill Clinton, Roger Clemens, Martha 
Stewart, and Lil’ Kim have in common?  How about adding Marion Jones, Barry Bonds, Tammy 
Thomas, Kwame Kilpatrick, Frank Quattrone, Donald Siegelman, and Lewis Libby?  The list of 
notable names could go on, each sharing a particular experience in common. All have been accused 
of a ‘process crime’—an offense not against a particular person or property, but against the 
machinery of justice itself.”); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the 
Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 
460–61 (2000) (noting that the punishment for perjury is often not high enough to warrant 
prosecution and that the cost of investigating and trying perjury charges would be a large social 
cost); Watts, supra note 39, at 782–85 (discussing the impact of low prosecution rates on the 
deterrent effect of perjury statutes); Ron Spears, Diogenes Visits the Home of the Testimonial 
Whopper, ILL. B.J., Feb. 2008, at 105 (“Rarely used tools in the truth-telling arsenal, perjury 
prosecutions are a clumsy deterrent.”). 
 251. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1990) (discussing the deterrent effect of 
perjury laws); Teresa A. Cheek, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine in Delaware: A Survey, 6 DEL. L. 
REV. 311, 316 (2003) (“[P]erjury and soliciting the commission of perjury [are] both crimes, which 
would have some deterrent effect on employers wishing to induce their employees to commit 
perjury . . . .”); Avraham D. Tabbach, The Social Desirability of Punishment Avoidance, 26 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 265, 266 (2010) (“The law has always attempted to deter certain avoidance efforts.  
Some avoidance efforts, such as perjury and obstruction of justice, are themselves deemed 
punishable crimes.”). 
 252. Michael L. Closen, To Swear . . . Or Not to Swear Document Signers: The Default of 
Notaries Public and A Proposal to Abolish Oral Notarial Oaths, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 613, 631 (2002). 
 253. Simply generating awareness of a criminal law’s existence might increase the positive 
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Truth telling is just as important in arbitration as it is in litigation 
because the arbitrator is making final determinations of contested facts 
and law.  Increasingly, arbitrators decide issues of statutory, 
constitutional, and other important participant rights.  Without the 
deterrent effect of the perjury laws, parties have less incentive to tell the 
truth in the arbitration forum.  As noted in Part I, arbitration has a 
reputation as being a “wild west” or “no rules” type of forum, and as 
such, arbitration’s reputation as a fair forum is sometimes called into 
question.254  Extending the perjury and tampering rules to the arbitral 
forum would help with arbitration’s reputation as a legitimate forum in 
which important rights can be determined by private arbitrators pursuant 
to the parties’ agreements.255 
3. Perjury and Tampering Laws Already Extend to Other Quasi-
Judicial Proceedings 
Arbitral forums are recognized as quasi-judicial forums, and as such, 
perjury laws should apply to them in the same manner that they apply to 
other judicial and quasi-judicial forums.  Extending perjury laws to 
arbitration would simply put arbitration in line with the rules already 
well-established in other forums. 
No question exists that arbitrations are considered quasi-judicial 
forums.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly considers 
arbitration to be a quasi-judicial forum.256  Similarly, courts routinely
                                                                                                                       
behavior sought by criminalizing the opposite bad behavior.  For instance, the criminal law 
repercussions for not wearing a seat belt have by and large revolutionized the behavior of millions of 
U.S. drivers, who now largely all wear seat belts.  The U.S. Department of Transportation reported 
in September 2010 that seat belt usage increased to 85% nationwide, up from a baseline of 58% in 
1994.  Traffic Safety Facts, NHTSA (Sept. 2010), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811378.pdf. 
 254. See supra Part I. 
 255. Perhaps extending these types of criminal laws to the arbitral forum would help quell some 
of the anti-arbitration proponents because the increased regulation of the arbitral process would help 
curb potential for abuse within the arbitral forum. 
 256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 585 cmt. c (1977) (including an arbitrator as a 
“judicial officer” for purposes of judicial immunity); § 586 cmt. d (noting that judicial proceedings 
“include all proceedings before an officer or other tribunal exercising a judicial function” and that 
“an arbitration proceeding may be included.”); § 587 cmt. f (same). 
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hold that arbitrations constitute quasi-judicial forums.257  In addition, 
many scholars recognize that arbitration is a quasi-judicial proceeding.258 
Because the perjury and tampering laws already apply to other quasi-
judicial forums, extension to the arbitral forum would not constitute a 
significant stretch.  For instance, perjury laws routinely apply to the 
quasi-judicial forum of grand jury proceedings to encourage truthfulness 
of the witnesses who testify within that forum.259  Different types of 
quasi-judicial proceedings also fall within the reach of the perjury and 
tampering statutes.260  Because arbitration is already a well-recognized 
type of quasi-judicial proceeding, and because many other types of 
quasi-judicial proceedings are already subject to the perjury and 
tampering laws, logic dictates that arbitration, too, should be subject to 
these important procedural protections.261 
                                                          
 257. See, e.g., Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 477 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 
(10th Cir. 2007) (discussing arbitrations as quasi-judicial processes in the context of arbitral 
immunity); Portland Gen. Electric Co. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 218 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 
2000) (noting that arbitrators play a quasi-judicial role when they preside over adversary hearings 
and admit evidence); Galuska v. NYSE, No. 99-3522, 2000 WL 347851, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 
2000) (noting that some courts consider arbitrators to be the “functional equivalent” of a judge); 
Fitigues, Inc. v. Varat, No. 92-4161, 1992 WL 245553 at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 1993) (describing 
judges as quasi-judicial officers); Lewis v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 12, 13 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Though counsel 
in this case meticulously avoided asking questions that would require the arbitration panel member 
to testify concerning the deliberations of the arbitration panel, the practice of calling a member of a 
quasi-judicial body to explain or otherwise embellish its decision is not permitted.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Mediation in Employment and Creeping Legalism: 
Implications for Dispute Systems Design, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 129, 130–31 (2010) (discussing the 
history of labor arbitration and noting the quasi-judicial manner of arbitration that prevailed); Dennis 
R. Nolan, Disputatio: “Creeping Legalism” as a Declension Myth, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6 
(discussing two different types of models of arbitration, noting that the more formal, quasi-judicial 
type of arbitration won out in the marketplace); Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 120, 144 (2009) (arguing that due process should apply “to all judges, as well as to 
quasi-judicial decisionmakers, including arbitrators”); Kathryn A. Windsor, Comment, Defining 
Arbitrator Evident Partiality: The Catch-22 of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. 
REV. 191, 215 (2009) (noting that because of the quasi-judicial nature of arbitration, arbitrators 
should conduct extensive conflicts checks). 
 259. Jon Reidy et al., The Contempt Trap, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 43–44 (2008). 
 260. See, e.g., James v. Ozmint, No. 1:11-1646-TMC, 2011 WL 5149185, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 
2011) (giving clerk of courts quasi-judicial immunity from perjury charge); Joshua B. Orenstein, 
Absolute Privilege from Defamation Claims and the Devaluing of Teachers’ Professional 
Reputations, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (noting that a defining characteristic of a “quasi-
judicial” proceeding is one in which witnesses testify under penalty of perjury); Shannon L. Shaffin, 
Loss of Integrity May Mean Loss of the Farm: False Statements Made in Federal Water Subsidy 
Applications And the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 15 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 1, 23 (2006) 
(noting that proceedings with the Bureau of Reclamation are subject to the penalty of perjury). 
 261. This Article does not propose changing the definition of “official proceeding” to include the 
term “quasi-judicial.”  Such a change in the MPC and state statutes across the country would likely 
lead to the same result as advocated here, i.e., applying these “litigation” criminal laws to the arbitral 
forum.  This Article advocates specifically using the term “arbitration” in order to take away any 
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4. Arbitral Immunity Already Extends to Arbitration Participants, So
Perjury and Tampering Laws Should Also Apply 
Because arbitration is a quasi-judicial forum, courts are now 
extending the common law rules of judicial immunity to arbitration 
participants.262  In other words, arbitration participants cannot be sued for 
defamation based on statements made within the arbitral forum.  This 
extension of the common law rule of immunity only makes sense if the 
rules of perjury are also applied to arbitration.  Essentially, the law has 
extended the benefits of immunity—i.e., protection from suit—to 
arbitration without also ensuring procedural safeguards exist to 
encourage truth-telling and to discourage lying—i.e., the criminal law.  
Unless state and federal legislatures change the law to apply the perjury 
and tampering laws to the arbitral forum, arbitration participants will be 
able to lie with impunity and not face any type of repercussion—civil or 
criminal. 
Under the American legal system, no civil cause of action exists for 
lying in a judicial proceeding—in other words, “no American jurisdiction 
recognizes a common law tort cause of action for perjury.”263  In addition 
to promoting truth-telling,264 two other important policy reasons exist for 
the limitation on the right to bring civil suits against parties who have 
engaged in misconduct in the litigation forum.  First, perjury laws 
encourage parties to invoke the courts to resolve disputes without fear of 
judicial repercussion for claimed false statements and damage to 
reputation.  Second, judicial immunity curbs the possibility of endless 
satellite litigation based on statements made in one judicial forum, and 
then the next forum, and so on, until the litigation looks and feels longer 
than that in Bleak House.265  This section analyzes these policy reasons 
for the immunity rule and how they apply to the arbitral forum, and it  
                                                                                                                       
doubt that arbitration fits within the scope of the statute.  There already exists an argument that the 
laws apply to the arbitral forum.  See supra Part III.A.1.a.  Because that argument is admittedly 
weak, this Article proposes a change in the law to make the obligations of parties and attorneys 
working within the arbitral forum crystal clear both in scope and application. 
 262. This rule is being extended to all arbitration participants, including arbitrators, witnesses, 
and attorneys.  See infra Part III.C.4.c. 
 263. Watts, supra note 39, at 775–76 (footnote omitted).  Watts also notes that while witness 
immunity usually applies to defamation claims, it also applies to claims of perjury.  Id. at 776.   
 264. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 265. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).  Bleak 
House is the famous Charles Dickens novel dealing with seemingly endless litigation over an estate 
that lasted several generations without final resolution. 
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concludes by demonstrating how the perjury rules must apply as a 
backstop to the potential abuses of immunity. 
a. Encouraging Redress of Problems Applies Equally in Arbitration 
First, immunity serves the purpose of encouraging parties to seek 
legal redress for their wrongs.  The purpose of judicial immunity—
sometimes called an “absolute privilege” or “litigation privilege”—is to 
allow people to “speak truly . . . without fear of personal liability or an 
expensive lawsuit.”266  The litigation privilege arises from the common 
law.267  The subjective intent of the speaker does not matter, and the 
absolute privilege protects litigation participants from being subject to a 
                                                          
 266. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 412 (2001); see also Boyd v. Bressler, 18 F. App’x. 
360, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (“In determining whether the writings or statements are reasonably related 
to the matter of inquiry, Ohio courts construe the absolute privilege with great liberality to assure 
that parties or their attorneys are not deterred from prosecuting an action vigorously for fear of 
personal liability.”); Harvey v. Montgomery Cnty., Tex., No. 11-CV-1815, 2012 WL 12530, at *6 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2012) (“Policy interests justifying immunity include the fact that the fear of suit 
may cause the prosecutor to shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment 
required by his public trust.” (citation omitted)); Hopkins v. O’Connor, 925 A.2d 1030, 1042 (Conn. 
2007) (“Participants in a judicial process must be able to testify or otherwise take part without being 
hampered by fear of defamation suits.”); Simms v. Seaman, 23 A.3d 1, 13 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) 
(“While no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury 
are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness’ statements.” (citation omitted)); In re 
Raspanti, 8 So. 3d 526, 533–34 (La. 2009) (“Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that 
communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings carry an absolute privilege so that 
witnesses, bound by their oaths to tell the truth, may speak freely without fear of civil suits for 
damages.”); Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 712 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The 
absolute immunity of witnesses and parties from claims for damages arising out of their trial 
testimony is premised on public policy concerns that favor ‘ascertainment of truth’ over self-
censorship that may result from witnesses’ ‘fear of subsequent liability.’” (citation omitted)); 
Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 549 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (“An absolute privilege 
for words spoken in the course of a judicial proceeding was thought necessary to promote 
testimonial candor by shielding witnesses from fear of subsequent civil suits; criminal penalties were 
deemed sufficient sanctions against perjury.”); Sinrod v. Stone, No. 14854103, 2004 WL 6039596, 
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 2004) (“The public interest in maintaining high standards among 
members of the bar, and the necessity that persons be given a forum in which to lodge complaints 
without fear of being sued for libel, warrants that absolute privilege be maintained, even at the risk 
that some attorneys will be falsely or maliciously accused of wrongdoing.”); Ims v. Town of 
Portsmouth, 32 A.3d 914, 928 (R.I. 2011) (“The doctrine of absolute privilege exists because it is 
more important that witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability for what they say than that a 
person who has been defamed by their testimony have a remedy.” (citation omitted)); see also Paul 
T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 1027 
(1993) (“We should recognize, in other words, that the absolute privilege, much like constitutional 
protections for speech, provides breathing room allowing for speech without fear.”). 
 267. Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, 22 A.3d 710, 716 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(“This absolute privilege to speak freely in relation to litigation without fear of being sued for 
defamation is a long-standing common law rule.”). 
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defamation lawsuit based on statements made in the proceeding.268  In 
other words, the absolute privilege helps protect freedom of speech and a 
right to seek redress for wrongs. 
This policy similarly applies to the arbitral forum.  Parties should be 
able to seek redress for wrongs done to them, whether or not they have 
arbitration clauses, and those parties should be able to seek redress 
without fear of any repercussions.269  As the Supreme Court noted, 
arbitrators are well-equipped to resolve a wide variety of disputes,270 and 
immunity might help encourage parties to seek out the arbitral forum.  If 
arbitration participants do not have any fear of civil liability for 
defamation based on arbitration statements, then they should feel free to 
bring their claims and testify truthfully and without fear at the hearings. 
b. Reducing Satellite Litigation 
Second, the policy supporting immunity by eliminating satellite 
litigation applies equally to the arbitral forum.  If no immunity exists, 
then the losing party could sue the winning party for defamation because 
in cases of contested fact, the fact finder would have believed one 
version of the facts over the other.  This type of rule would spin off 
endless litigation by non-winning parties.271  Courts commonly recognize 
immunity as a measure to curb satellite litigation.272  This point was 
                                                          
 268. John Jay Fossett, Defamation in the Work Place: “The New Workhorse in Termination 
Litigation”, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 93, 104 (1988) (“Absolute privilege protects the speaker 
notwithstanding his purpose and motive.”); Jeffrey E. Thomas, A Pragmatic Approach to Meaning 
in Defamation Law, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 365–66 (1999) (“Meaning is irrelevant to the 
absolute privilege because its purpose is to allow those involved in judicial, legislative, and 
executive proceedings to have the full freedom to express themselves without fear of being sued for 
defamation.”). 
 269. See Ching v. Valencia, No. 27331, 2008 WL 3919892, at *1 (Haw. Aug. 27, 2008) (“In 
light of this court’s policies (1) to avoid the chilling effect of possible subsequent litigation and (2) 
in favor of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, a private contractual arbitration will not 
support a subsequent claim for malicious prosecution.”); see also Lambert v. Carneghi, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 626, 639–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“The privilege protects statements made in private, contractual 
arbitration proceedings in order to encourage witnesses to provide open and candid testimony.”). 
 270. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 271. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 cmt. a (1977) (“The final judgment of the 
tribunal must be based upon the facts as shown by their testimony, and it is necessary therefore that a 
full disclosure not be hampered by fear of private suits for defamation.”). 
 272. See, e.g., McNeil v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., No. 2:68CV41DAK, 2009 WL 2554726, 
at *10 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2009) (“An absolute privilege extends to persons whose special positions 
or status requires that they be as free as possible from fear that their actions in their position might 
subject them to legal action.” (citation omitted)); Carnegie Int’l Corp. v. Grant Thornton, LLP, No. 
24-C-00-002639, 2006 WL 990960, at *2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30 2006) (“The underlying rationale for 
 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 969 
eloquently expressed by the Supreme Court of Florida: “Just as 
participants in litigation must be free to engage in unhindered 
communication, so too must those participants be free to use their best 
judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of having to 
defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.”273  As 
with the point above, judicial immunity allows the participants to avail 
themselves of the forum without fear of civil repercussion. 
This policy reason applies equally—if not more so—to the arbitral 
forum.  Curbing satellite litigation is an admirable policy goal no matter 
the forum—be it litigation or arbitration.  By granting immunity to 
arbitral participants, attorneys and witnesses may freely testify truthfully 
and to the best of their ability in pursuing claims and defenses. 
The reason that this policy might apply with even more force to the 
arbitral forum is because of arbitration’s benefits of speed, efficiency, 
and finality.  The Supreme Court recently commented that parties pursue 
private dispute resolution to achieve “‘lower costs, greater efficiency and 
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized 
disputes.’”274  If no immunity exists, then the arbitral process can be 
extended to litigation in the form of satellite litigation, such as post-
arbitration civil actions for defamation.  In this sense, without providing 
immunity to arbitral participants, arbitration could become a less efficient 
forum compared to litigation because of the possibility that post-
arbitration litigation for defamation would exist for arbitral participants 
but not litigation participants.  Accordingly, this policy serves arbitration 
for the same—if not better—reasons than litigation because it both 
reduces the fear of satellite litigation and helps ensure that arbitration 
remains a more efficient and cost-effective forum for dispute resolution. 
                                                                                                                       
the absolute privilege is to encourage participants involved in the judicial search for truth ‘to do so 
without being hampered by the fear of private suits for defamation.’” (citation omitted)); Perdue, 
Brackett, Flores, Utt & Burns v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair, Sampson & Meeks, L.L.P., 291 S.W.3d 
448, 451 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (“The public policy behind the application of the absolute privilege to 
judicial proceedings is that the administration of justice requires full disclosure from witnesses, 
unhampered by fear of retaliatory suits for defamation.”); Lombardo v. Traughber, 990 S.W.2d 958, 
960 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“Any communication, even perjured testimony, made in the course of a 
judicial proceeding, cannot serve as the basis for a suit in tort.”). 
 273. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 
So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994). 
 274. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (quoting Stolt-Nielson 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)).  Concepcion did not deal with 
immunity or perjury and tampering, but it considered whether a California law relating to class 
arbitration waivers was preempted by the FAA.  Id.  The Court considered the hallmarks of bilateral 
arbitration and how bilateral arbitration differs in substantial ways from class arbitration.  Id. 
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c. Courts Are Extending Absolute Immunity to the Arbitral Forum 
Given that the benefits of immunity extend equally to the arbitral 
forum, courts have begun to extend absolute immunity to that forum.275  
This extension of the common law policy makes sense because the 
policy applies equally well—if not even more strongly—to the arbitral 
forum. 
For example, in Kidwell v. General Motors Corp., a Florida court 
determined that a party’s misconduct in an arbitration proceeding was 
covered by a judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.276  In this case, the 
plaintiff–customer filed a complaint against defendant and its employee, 
seeking to recover damages related to his purchase of a Chevrolet pickup 
truck.277  The plaintiff alleged that during an arbitration conducted by the 
Better Business Bureau (BBB) Auto Line Arbitration, the employee 
engaged in intentional misconduct, including lying under oath and 
scheming to deny the plaintiff “meaningful access to Chapter 681.”278  
The defendants argued that the arbitration proceeding was judicial or 
quasi-judicial, and thus the employee’s conduct was protected by 
immunity.279  The court agreed, holding that absolute immunity applied 
to “any act occurring during the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a defamatory 
                                                          
 275. This section considers cases applying the immunity doctrines to arbitration participants like 
parties, witnesses, and attorneys.  Many cases examining arbitration immunity, however, deal with 
whether the arbitrators are afforded immunity.  These cases universally hold that arbitrators are 
afforded immunity.  See Sacks v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Of course, arbitral 
immunity does not extend to every act of an arbitrator.  Arbitral immunity extends only to those acts 
taken by arbitrators ‘within the scope of their duties and within their jurisdiction.’” (citation 
omitted)); DeMarco v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-3055, 2011 WL 1104178, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 23, 2011) (recognizing absolute immunity from liability for damages to arbitrators in 
contractually agreed upon arbitration proceedings for all acts completed ‘within the scope of the 
arbitral process’” (citation omitted)).  Some states have statutes that specifically extend immunity to 
arbitrators.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.229 (West 2011) (“[A]n arbitrator or an arbitral 
organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a 
court of this State acting in a judicial capacity.”); see also Slaughter v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, No. 
2:10-CV-01437-KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 2174403, at *3 (D. Nev. June 2, 2011) (applying Nevada 
statute). 
 276. 975 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e agree with the trial court that [the 
employee] had immunity for his alleged wrongful actions because they occurred during an 
arbitration proceeding.”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id.  Chapter 681 is Florida’s “Lemon Law,” and that law specifically requires arbitration as 
a prerequisite for anyone seeking to make a claim in court under that law.  See FLA. STAT. § 681.109 
(2011). 
 279. Kidwell, 975 So. 2d at 504. 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 971 
statement or other tortious behavior, so long as the act has some relation 
to the proceeding.”280  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
arbitral process did not afford him due process, noting that the BBB Auto 
Line Arbitration program offered him the same protections as those 
provided in court, including “the opportunity to testify, present evidence, 
and cross-examine witnesses,” and the ability to appeal the arbitrator’s 
decision to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitrator Board.281  
Accordingly, the court found that judicial immunity applied to the 
arbitral proceeding and that no liability attached to the person who was 
accused of misconduct in arbitration in this collateral action.282 
In Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., a plaintiff–employee challenged his 
discharge in arbitration pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement.283  Testimony from a manager at the plant where the plaintiff 
worked accused the plaintiff of sleeping on the job and falsifying 
employment records.284  The plaintiff then filed suit for defamation 
against his former employer.285  In considering whether to apply the 
absolute privilege to arbitration, the court recognized that the purpose of 
the privilege is to escape liability when the defendant “is acting in 
furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to 
protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff’s 
reputation.”286  In this case, the social interest was the “free and 
unhindered flow of information”287  Because the arbitration hearing 
constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding, the defendants in the case were  
 
                                                          
 280. Id. at 505 (citation omitted). 
 281. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 681.109).  The decision also notes that the plaintiff failed to appeal 
the adverse award.  Id. 
 282. The opinion does not state whether an appeal on these same grounds would have been 
successful.  Id. at 504–05. 
 283. 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.  The court also relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts for authority that arbitral 
proceedings should be covered by absolute privilege.  Id. at 1288 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 587, 588 (1977)).  The court found arbitration to constitute a “quasi-judicial” tribunal 
under Illinois law.  Id. at 1288–89 (“Under Illinois law, a tribunal is quasi-judicial when its [sic] 
possesses powers and duties to (1) exercise judgment and discretion; (2) hear and determine or 
ascertain facts and decide; (3) make binding orders and judgments; (4) affect the personal or 
property rights of private persons; (5) examine witnesses, compel the attendance of witnesses, and 
hear the litigation of issues on a hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose penalties.” (citing 
Adco Servs., Inc. v. Bullard, 628 N.E.2d 772, 774–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)). 
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afforded “absolute immun[ity] from suit for communications made in 
plaintiff’s arbitration hearing.”288 
The Maryland case of Odyniec v. Schneider289demonstrates why 
applying absolute immunity to the arbitral forum serves the important 
goals underlying the doctrine.  Odyniec involved plaintiffs who sued an 
expert witness for defamation based on statements made in an 
arbitration.290  The underlying arbitration involved a medical malpractice 
claim against certain doctors, the plaintiffs in Odyniec.291  The defendant 
in the civil case was hired as an expert witness by the defense at 
arbitration, and during a pre-hearing consultation the expert witness–
defendant stated to the injured claimant that the plaintiff–doctors 
provided false statements and performed needless surgery.292  The 
plaintiff–doctors then sued expert witness–defendant for defamation.  
The court recognized the underlying policies behind the judicial 
privilege: “[b]ecause the need for participants to speak freely during 
judicial proceedings is so essential to the judicial process, the 
individual’s right to redress for defamation is necessarily curtailed.”293  
The court extended immunity to expert witness, even though the 
statement was unsolicited and not even made during the arbitration 
hearing, because the purposes of immunity would be satisfied.294  
Ultimately, the court determined that “the social benefit derived from 
free and candid participation by potential witnesses in the arbitration 
process is essential to achieve the goal of a fair and just resolution of 
claims of malpractice against health care providers.”295  Thus, the 
                                                          
 288. Id. at 1289. 
 289. 588 A.2d 786 (Md. 1991). 
 290. Id. at 787–88. 
 291. Id. at 787. 
 292. Id. at 788. 
 293. Id. at 790 (citation omitted). 
 294. Id. at 793 (“That [the defendant’s] defamatory statement may have been gratuitous, 
unsolicited, and in part irrelevant to the purpose for which he was employed, and was not made 
during the actual hearing before the arbitration panel, does not defeat the absolute privilege.  
Whatever [the defendant’s] motivation may have been, he made his verbal statement to [the patient], 
a party in the then-pending arbitration proceeding, while he was conducting a medical examination 
of her in preparation for his participation in that proceeding.  It was thus made in the course of his 
participation in that pending proceeding and therefore, without regard to its relevance, the verbal 
statement is accorded the same absolute privilege as if it had been made by a witness during the 
arbitration hearing itself.”). 
 295. Id.; see also Yeung v. Maric, 232 P.3d 1281, 1285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).  The Yeung court 
extended the privilege to a physician witness in an arbitration and observed: “These principles 
support a corresponding immunity for witnesses who participate in arbitration proceedings.  
Arbitrators perform quasi-judicial functions, and arbitration proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature.  
 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 973 
important social policies underlying immunity caused the Maryland court 
to apply immunity to the arbitral forum. 
As these cases demonstrate, courts have not hesitated to extend the 
litigation immunity to the arbitral forum for all of the same reasons that 
the immunity exists in the first place.  None of these cases, however, 
consider the applicability of the perjury and tampering laws to the 
arbitral forum. 
 
d. The Criminal Perjury and Tampering Laws Must Be Extended to the
Arbitral Forum to Prevent Arbitration from Becoming an Ethical 
“Black Hole” 
Because the policies supporting civil immunity apply to arbitration, 
the extension of immunity to the arbitral forum makes perfect sense.  
Immunity, however, is only one side of the coin.  The purpose of the 
perjury and tampering statutes is to provide some repercussion in the 
event that the parties do not act ethically and truthfully.  By not 
extending the perjury and tampering laws to the arbitral forum, the courts 
have created an ethical “black hole” around the arbitral forum.296  
                                                                                                                       
Witnesses in private, contractual uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage arbitration proceedings 
should generally be covered by the absolute privilege regarding defamatory statements, assuming the 
statements are related to the proceeding and basic procedural safeguards are present in the 
proceeding.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 296. Not all commentators agree with the extension of immunity to arbitration.  See, e.g., Peter 
Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining Arbitral Immunity As a Solution to 
Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 PACE L. REV. 113, 116 (2005) (recommending replacing 
arbitrator and provider immunity with damage caps and liability waivers); Emmanuela Truli, 
Liability v. Quasi-Judicial Immunity of the Arbitrator: The Case Against Absolute Arbitral 
Immunity, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 384–85 (2006) (skeptical of immunity in the context of 
international arbitrations); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of 
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 460 (2004) (arguing that a rule of 
qualified immunity for arbitrators is better than utilizing the rule of absolute immunity); W. Monroe 
Bonnheim, Note, Immunity and Justice for All: Has the Second Circuit Overextended the Doctrine of 
Absolute Immunity by Applying It to Arbitration Witnesses?, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 224 
(suggesting that courts are extending immunity without thoroughly considering the situation); 
Meredith Goldich, Comment, Throwing Out the Threshhold: Analyzing the Severability Conundrum 
Under Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1681 (2011) (“In addition to 
reviewability problems, arbitrators often remain immune from malpractice suits, and unlike judges, 
arbitrators’ decisions are not available to the public.  The lack of judicial review, combined with 
arbitrators’ malpractice immunity, may deprive arbitration claimants of protection from the mistakes 
of arbitrators.”); Sarah Roitman, Note, Beyond Reproach: Has the Doctrine of Arbitral Immunity 
Been Extended Too Far For Arbitration Sponsoring Firms, 51 B.C. L. REV. 557, 566 (2010) (calling 
for a legislative change to remedy the perceived problem of over-extension of immunity to arbitral 
providers).  But see Michael D. Moberly, Immunizing Arbitrators From Claims of Equitable Relief, 5 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 325, 327–28 (2005) (arguing that arbitrators should be immune from, among 
other things, claims for equitable relief). 
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Immunity without a corresponding criminal law disincentivizes good 
behavior for arbitration participants—especially for non-lawyers who are 
not otherwise bound by the codes of attorney ethics. 
To correct this imbalance, legislatures should extend the perjury and 
tampering laws to the arbitral forum.  Simply by amending the definition 
of “official proceeding” to include arbitration specifically, state 
legislatures will go a long way toward promoting accountability and 
ethics for arbitral participants. 
5. Arbitral Providers Recognize the Need for a Fair Forum, but None
Specify Repercussions for Party or Attorney Unethical Behavior 
Fairness issues also dictate the ethical behavior of attorneys and 
parties in the arbitral forum, but the ethical role of attorneys and parties 
has long remained unaddressed by the arbitral forums and their ethical 
rules.  Many arbitral-provider organizations have rules addressing ethics 
for neutrals.297  The providers, however, do not have similar rules 
regarding participant—attorney and party—behavior.  The provider 
organizations’ failure to regulate participant conduct is further reason 
why the criminal law should address this gap in both the law and the way 
that arbitral providers regulate the process. 
In the 1990s, many of the arbitral providers began instituting codes 
of ethics and protocols to make the arbitration process fairer and to 
respond to criticisms of the arbitral process.298  For instance, the 
                                                          
 297. STEVEN W. SUFLAS, From Litigation to Arbitration, and Back Again?, in THE ROLE OF 
ETHICS IN ADR: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION OF 
ATTORNEYS ENGAGING IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, at 2 (2011) (“The ethics rules in 
arbitration emanate from a number of different sources.  The National Academy of Arbitrators has 
published its Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor Management Disputes.  
JAMS has its own code, entitled Arbitrators’ Ethics Guidelines, and the AAA has published a Code 
of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.  There are also separate rules governing labor and 
employment disputes in various states.  In my home state, the New Jersey State Board of Mediation 
has its own rules for arbitration procedures.  Thus, at the outset, both lawyers and arbitrators must 
determine and digest the rules that will apply to a particular proceeding, keeping a keen eye on the 
general ethical rules of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration takes place, as well as the rules of the 
states that license the participants.”). 
 298. The timing of these documents is not coincidental.  The arbitral providers began addressing 
issues of fairness in arbitration in a more systematic way following the Gilmer decision and the 
increased use of arbitration to hear statutory claims.  See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the changing 
nature of arbitration; see also SUFLAS, supra note 297 (“In the aftermath of the Supreme Court 
opinion in Gilmer and its progeny, the procedural rules governing many employment arbitrations 
changed significantly, and for an interesting reason.  In the face of a judicial call for greater use of 
ADR, plaintiffs’ lawyers who represent employees in these cases went to Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Services Inc. (JAMS) and the American Arbitration Association (AAA)—the two primary 
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American Arbitration Association (AAA) implemented an Employment 
Due Process Protocol in 1995299 and a Consumer Due Process Protocol 
in 1998300 to address these fairness issues.  The purposes of these 
protocols is to regulate the forum and the neutrals—not necessarily the 
parties’ or attorneys’ conduct.301  These Protocols require safeguards 
such as: 
[Q]ualified, independent, and impartial neutrals chosen by an equal 
voice of the parties, an independent administration, reasonable cost 
which may require the business rather than the consumer to pay, a 
reasonably convenient location, reasonable time limits, a right to 
representation, encouragement of mediation, clear notice of the 
arbitration provisions and their consequences, access to information to 
ensure a fair hearing, a fair hearing, availability of all remedies that 
would be available in court, application by the arbitrator of pertinent 
contract terms, statutes and legal precedents and, on request, the 
provision of an explanation of the basis for the award.302 
These safeguards only address issues within the forum’s control or 
the arbitrator’s control—and not participant conduct.303  The focus of 
                                                                                                                       
providers of arbitrators and arbitration processes—and threatened a boycott unless the agencies 
developed rules that provided adequate procedural protections for their clients.  The result was the 
convening of a Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, which published a 
due process protocol for mediation and arbitration of statutory disputes arising out of the 
employment relationship.  Both JAMS and the AAA responded with rules that provided for more 
discovery than had originally existed.”) 
 299. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011 Revised Version), 
available at http://www.adr.org (highlight “Rules & Procedures,” then click “Codes & Protocols”). 
 300. NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM. & AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER 
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2007), available at http://www.adr.org (highlight “Rules & Procedures,” 
then click Codes & Protocols”). 
 301. See Edna Sussman, The Dodd-Frank Act: Seeking Fairness and the Public Interest in 
Consumer Arbitration, N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW., Fall 2011, at 29, available at 
http://www.sussmanadr.com/docs/Dodd%20Frank%20NYSBA%20version%20%20fall%202011.pd
f (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (discussing private sector arbitration protocols put in place by the 
American Arbitration Association). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id.  The provider organizations may be concerned that they do not have jurisdiction to 
govern private party conduct, and thus focus on issues well within their control.  The provider 
organizations, however, could regulate attorney and participant conduct by instituting sanctions for 
violating parties.  Those sanctions could include things such as withdrawing from the case or 
preventing an offending attorney from receiving services from that provider again.  The criminal law 
is not the only potential remedy.  The provider organizations could also take steps to prevent 
participant misbehavior.  Given the providers’ current unwillingness to police participant misconduct 
directly, an extension of the criminal law to the arbitral forum is particularly pressing.  As support 
for the argument that arbitral providers are capable of self-regulation, see Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1128–29 (2011) (discussing 
how due process protocols are the forum’s method of self-policing and discussing the scope of the 
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these protocols largely concerns parties’ rights to representation, 
discovery, fairness in procedure, and availability of remedies.304  But 
these protocols do not deal with participant responsibilities—only 
participant rights.305  In other words, the private marketplace has an 
enforcement gap with respect to party conduct, and an extension of the 
criminal law to arbitration would fill this gap. 
In a similar vein, the Codes of Ethics promulgated by the provider 
organizations deal with arbitrator ethics—not participant ethics.306  The 
Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators, revised in 2004, facially only 
applies to arbitrators.307  The Code provides that the “arbitrator should 
uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitration process” by ensuring 
that arbitrators are free from bias and are competent to hear the cases 
before them.308  The JAMS ethical guidelines similarly provide that an 
“arbitrator should uphold the dignity and integrity of the office of the 
arbitration process.”309  Again, the arbitral providers have had success 
                                                                                                                       
protocols). 
 304. See Sussman, supra note 301. 
 305. Id. 
 306. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, THE CODE OF ETHICS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 
(2011), available at http://www.adr.org (highlight “Rules & Procedures,” then click “Codes & 
Protocols”).  Of course, not all arbitrations are conducted through an arbitral provider.  One of the 
benefits of arbitration is its flexibility and ability to use any arbitrator of the parties’ choosing.  See 
Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and 
Emerging Standards, 5 WYO. L. REV. 453, 454 (2005) (noting that arbitrators are generally 
appointed by the parties or nominated by the arbitral institution).  Arbitration outside of a provider 
organization, called ad hoc arbitration, remains completely unregulated outside of state law and the 
FAA—neither of which directly govern issues such as participant misconduct.  See Jacob R. Shaffer, 
Rescuing the Arbitral Model: Identifying the Problem in Natural Resources Trade and Development, 
114 W. VA. L. REV. 309, 313–14 (2011) (noting that the rules and procedures in ad hoc arbitrations 
are chosen in advance or on the fly by the parties).  The fact that arbitration occurs outside of the 
provider organizations (and is otherwise unregulated) is another reason to extend the criminal law to 
apply to arbitration participants when those participants lie and tamper with witnesses and evidence. 
 307. AM. BAR ASS’N & AM. ARBITRATION. ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
dispute/commercial_disputes.authcheckdam.pdf.  Both the AAA and the ABA worked together to 
promulgate these rules.  The intent of these rules is to regulate arbitrator’s behavior when working 
under the rules of the AAA. 
 308. Id. Canon I (2004) (emphasis added).  Fairness and impartiality of neutrals was the primary 
concern of the drafters of the 2004 revisions to the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics.  Bruce Meyerson & 
John M. Townsend, Revised Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators Explained, 59 DISP. RESO. 
J. 10, 11 (2004) (“The most fundamental and far-reaching change contained in the 2004 Revision is 
the application of a presumption of neutrality to all arbitrators, including party-appointed 
arbitrators.”). 
 309. JAMS, ARBITRATORS ETHICS GUIDELINES I, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/ 
arbitrators-ethics/.  In the area of labor and employment arbitrations, the AAA Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor–Management Disputes similarly only applies to the 
arbitrators and not to other arbitration participants.  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CODE OF 
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regulating the arbitrators, but they have not regulated the participants in 
any meaningful way. 
Perhaps this focus on arbitrators is short-sighted given the possibility 
that not just the arbitrators, but the participants might be causing some of 
the problems in arbitration.310  While certainly both the criminal law and 
the rules of the arbitral providers could prohibit this conduct, extending 
the criminal law appears to be the more viable alternative given the gap 
in marketplace regulation. 
6. Judicial Review Is Currently Unduly Limited in Scope for Dealing
with Participant Misconduct 
A final reason that the criminal law should be amended to 
criminalize arbitral perjury and tampering is because it provides a second 
forum to achieve redress of litigation problems, other than the limited 
judicial review available under section 10 of the FAA.311  Two issues 
arise, in particular, with respect to judicial review.  First, litigants in 
court have the opportunity to both appeal312 and attempt to institute 
charges with the prosecutor for perjury and tampering.  As noted above, 
                                                                                                                       
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR–MANAGEMENT DISPUTES (2011), 
available at http://www.adr.org (highlight “Arbitrators & Mediators,” then click “Codes of Ethics” 
and “Labor Neutrals Code of Professional Responsibility”). 
 310. Perhaps one of the reasons why a code of ethics governing participant behavior has not been 
created yet is because no such problem has been perceived to exist.  This argument, however, does 
not hold true when considering the fact that arbitrator misconduct was not a significant problem at 
the time of the adoption of the model codes.  Meyerson & Townsend, supra note 308, at 10 (noting 
that the creation of the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics was not spurred by actual problems with arbitrator 
misconduct, but because of a genuine concern for improving the arbitral process).  Perhaps outside 
pressure—particularly from the plaintiff/claimant bar—forced the creation of some of these ethical 
codes with respect to arbitrators, and similar outside pressure currently does not exist regarding 
attorney and participant conduct. 
 311. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).  Judicial review under section 10 is extremely limited, even in 
cases of fraud and other misconduct.  See supra note 1. 
 312. Admittedly, the standard of review available to a litigant in court is different than a party in 
arbitration; however, this Article does not suggest broadening the standard of review provided in 
FAA section 10(a), even with respect to the review for fraud.  As noted in Part II, the parties 
bargained for arbitration under general contract law, and part of the bargain is limited judicial review 
under FAA section 10.  Limited judicial review promotes the concepts of finality, see supra Part 
III.C.4.b, and this Article does not suggest altering that balance between review and finality.  Adding 
potential criminal violation would simply afford arbitration participants additional rights—but 
limited rights that are in the power of a third-party prosecutor, as opposed to themselves in private 
litigation for defamation and other causes of action.  See supra Part III.C.4.c (discussing the benefits 
of absolute immunity in the context of arbitration).  Even if the extension of the criminal law to 
arbitration mostly just provides a greater deterrent effect, that effect still promotes the fairness of 
arbitration.  See supra notes 251–53 and accompanying text (regarding the deterrent effect of the 
criminal law and how the criminal law can change behavior in a socially positive manner). 
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the lack of perjury proceedings leaves arbitration advocates with only 
one recourse—limited review under section 10 of the FAA.  Second, the 
review under section 10 is limited compared with litigation appellate 
review.  The existence of limited judicial review313 supports the 
extension of criminal law in these situations to the arbitral forum.  These 
ideas are addressed in turn. 
a. Extension of the Criminal Law Regarding Perjury and Tampering
Would Place Arbitration Participants on Equal Footing with 
Litigation Participants in Terms of Avenues for Review 
First, litigation parties have two judicial avenues314 for dealing with 
serious misbehavior in the litigation process, namely perjury or 
tampering.  Litigants are free to appeal decisions tainted by such 
misconduct under normal appellate rules.315  Litigants also have the 
option of asking the prosecutor to bring criminal charges against the 
perpetrator of the misconduct.  Arbitration parties, while possessing 
some limited rights to appeal, are foreclosed from this second avenue of 
pursuing redress for grievous misconduct.  In other words, litigants have 
two proverbial bites at the apple, while arbitration participants only have 
one. 
Providing arbitration participants with an opportunity to seek redress 
from the prosecutor would extend to those participants an important right 
relating to having claims resolved in a neutral and unbiased forum.  Such 
extension of the criminal law would well serve the policies set forth in 
the Supreme Court’s Gilmer decision.  Under Gilmer and the subsequent 
cases, the Court expressed concern about adequately vindicating 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.  The Court considered challenges to 
fairness in arbitration, such as arbitrator bias, adequacy of discovery, 
adequacy of arbitral awards, availability of relief, and unequal bargaining 
                                                          
 313. This Article does not advocate changing the standard of review under the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  Other scholars have advocated for expanded judicial review as a way of remedying 
certain perceived injustices in the arbitral forum.  See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 220, at 874 
(advocating expanded judicial review for all adhesion, mandatory arbitration agreements). 
 314. Admittedly, other avenues also exist, including filing a disciplinary action against an 
attorney who has violated the ethical rules discussed above, or perhaps even a claim of malpractice 
against an attorney.  Self-help remedies (not endorsed by this Article) hypothetically also exist, but 
this section attempts to deal with the primary judicial remedies available to litigants. 
 315. This avenue is—to a lesser extent—available to arbitration participants.  See infra Part 
III.C.6.b. 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 979 
power.316  By affording arbitral participants the right to ask the 
prosecutor to pursue criminal charges for wrongdoing in the arbitral 
forum, such law would further the policy set forth in Gilmer—
particularly as it relates to the availability of remedies. 
b. Given Arbitration’s Limited Review, Criminal Remedies in the 
Event of Serious Misconduct Would Make the Forum Fairer 
Second, limited review of arbitration awards—in and of itself—
supports the extension of the criminal law to allegations of perjury and 
tampering in the arbitral forum.  Review of arbitral awards is necessarily 
limited in order to promote the laudable policy of arbitration finality.  
Limited review does not, however, always cover wrongs such as perjury 
or tampering.  Therefore, limited review weighs in favor of extending the 
criminal law to provide some remedy for serious misconduct in the 
arbitral forum. 
The FAA provides that an award may be vacated, inter alia, if it is 
procured by fraud.317  Fraud, however, is difficult to prove in the 
arbitration context.318  To prove fraud in this context, an arbitration party 
must meet the following test: “that the fraud was (1) not discoverable 
upon the exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration, (2) materially 
related to an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”319  This standard of review is unlike any other 
                                                          
 316. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30–33 (1991). 
 317. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2006) (“In any of the following cases the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application 
of any party to the arbitration . . . where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means . . . .”).  The FAA has a handful of limited grounds for vacatur, but the one most often 
invoked in situations involving perjury or tampering is the exception for fraud.  See, e.g., In re 
Arbitration Between Trans Chem. Ltd. & China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 
304 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“Fraud requires a showing of bad faith during the arbitration proceedings, 
such as . . . willfully destroying or withholding evidence . . . .” (citations omitted)) , aff’d per curiam 
sub nom. Trans Chem. Ltd. V. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp.) 161 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 318. Fraud is often difficult to prove in any context.  Usually, a showing of fraud requires 
pleading with particularity.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (“[A] party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud.”).  Often fraud has a heightened burden of proof.  See infra 
note 319 and accompanying text.  Fraud in the context of arbitration is different than fraud generally, 
but it is still difficult to prove.  See Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co. v. United Transp. Co., 952 
F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing what constituted fraud at common law and what 
fraud can mean in an arbitration scenario). 
 319. Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 
(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982)) 
(affirming confirmation of an arbitration award despite allegations of document falsification because 
the information was discoverable with the exercise of due diligence); see also Smith W., LLC v. 
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under the FAA.  Generally, the grounds for review, while limited under 
FAA section 10, are examined by the trial court on a de novo basis.320  
The review for fraud—the most likely review applicable here—is even 
more limited than the other avenues for review given the higher burden 
of proof.321  Unsurprisingly, courts have frequently held that plaintiffs 
failed to meet this burden of proof in situations involving alleged perjury 
and evidence tampering.322  Parties that submitted—and lost—the issue 
of fraud or tampering to the arbitrator fare particularly poorly in post-
                                                                                                                       
Mognach Payne Inc., No. 1CA-CV09-0568, 2010 WL 2471051, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010) 
(“[A] party seeking to vacate an arbitration award claiming fraud must show ‘that the fraud was (1) 
not discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration, (2) materially related to 
an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and convincing evidence.’” (quoting Lafarge, 
791 F.2d at 1339)).  This test appears to be the test that a majority of the courts employ when 
confronted with a motion for vacatur on the grounds of fraud.  Other tests are employed in a 
minority of jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Prof’l Builders, Inc. v. Sedan Floral, Inc., 819 P.2d 1254, 1258 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the rule articulated in C.J.S.); 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 202 (2004) 
(“As a general rule any fraud or misconduct having a tendency to affect the award improperly will 
vitiate it and render it subject to impeachment.”). 
 320. The standard of review and the grounds for vacatur are often conflated.  The grounds for 
review are limited to things such as fraud, misconduct, or arbitrators exceeding their powers.  Great 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Moye, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)).  To 
vacate an award, a trial court must make findings that specific types of misconduct occurred, such as 
fraud, bias, and exceeding powers.  See Braata, Inc. v. Oneida Storage Co., 251 P.3d 584, 588 (Colo. 
App. 2010) (interpreting a state statute to require a finding that an arbitrator engaged in misconduct 
to vacate an arbitration award).  The burden of proving these elements by a party seeking vacatur is 
often an overlooked portion of the analysis, but some courts do recognize that the burden is 
generally decided by the trial court on a de novo basis.  See, e.g., Allstate N. J. Ins. Co. v. Driscoll, 
No. C-6209-09, 2011 WL 408837, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 9, 2011) (“Where, as here, a 
party seeks to vacate an award pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13c(3), the trial court ‘[s]hall make an 
independent determination of any facts relevant [to the application for vacating the award] de novo, 
upon such record as may exist or as it may determine in a summary expedited proceeding.’”); 
Braata, 251 P.3d at 588 (“The latter issue is explicitly assigned to the court to decide by section 13-
22-206(2), C.R.S.2009, and each of the other bases to vacate necessarily requires de novo findings 
by a court.”). 
 321. See supra text accompanying note 319 (laying out the burden of proof for fraud). 
 322. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations v. Pyrotek, Inc., No. 1:10cv388, 2010 WL 2639912, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio June 29, 2010) (holding that, under the same test, no clear and convincing evidence of 
fraud existed that was not already presented to the arbitrator, and further noting that the reason for 
the rule is that a broader review would “undermine a substantive determination made by the 
arbitrator”); Site, Inc. v. Peabody Constr. Co., Inc., No. 06-P-1229, 2007 WL 2458482, at *2 (Mass. 
App. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007) (“In addition, the court held that perjury itself does not constitute fraud for 
the purposes of vacating a judgment where the moving party cannot demonstrate that the judicial 
process itself was corrupted by the perjury.” (citing Wojcicki v. Caragher, 849 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 
(Mass. 2006))); Artco, Inc. v. DiFruscia, 365 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (“There is no fraud 
upon the court where a judgment has been ‘obtained with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of 
after-discovered evidence, is believed possibly to have been guilty of perjury.’” (quoting Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944))); Groves v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. MER-L-1471-04, 2006 WL 2059514, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
July 26, 2006) (finding movant did not establish fraud based on alleged document tampering when 
the arbitrator considered the issue in the first instance). 
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arbitration litigation on the bases that the arbitrator had considered the 
issue and that review is quite limited.323  Thus, extending the criminal 
laws of tampering and perjury to the arbitral forum would provide 
needed remedies—albeit different types of remedies—to those who have 
been the victims of arbitration-participant misconduct. 
While the “clear and convincing” evidence burden likely stems from 
the burden of proof for civil fraud,324 the application to the arbitral forum 
makes little sense.325  Parties seeking to vacate an arbitration award on 
the basis of fraud are not trying to prove a cause of action for fraud.  
These parties only seek to show that fraud existed such that an arbitral 
                                                          
 323. See Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Sullivan, Higgins & Brion, Civil No. 08-162-KI, 2008 WL 
4279632, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 18, 2008) (“[The plaintiff] also argues that it is prejudiced by 
defendants’ delay in seeking arbitration because of defendants’ alleged spoliation of evidence.  I am 
unpersuaded by [the plaintiff’s] contention that the arbitrator cannot appropriately remedy the 
situation, if he concludes that the allegations are true.”); Gateway Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., 
L.P. v. Field, Civil Action No. 04-4428, 2008 WL 2758877, at *5, *8–9 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2008) 
(confirming arbitration award despite arguments that one party destroyed documents when the 
arbitrator considered the issue on a full record and refused to apply an adverse inference); Jones v. 
Dykstra, No. B196521, 2008 WL 4901080, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008) (affirming 
confirmation of award because, under California law, judgment cannot be vacated on fraud 
presented in the former action, as “intrinsic” fraud); Banc of Am. Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Plycraft Indus., 
No. B168627, 2005 WL 905927, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2005) (enjoining a claim of spoliation 
from proceeding in arbitration under the doctrine of res judicata when the plaintiff failed to bring 
such a claim in a first arbitration against Banc of America and the plaintiff actually used evidence of 
the missing documentation in the first arbitration). 
Note, however, that the opposite is true, too.  If the arbitrator awards damages because of 
participant misconduct, that award will also be subject to quite limited review and likely confirmed.  
See, e.g., Hendrik Delivery Serv., Inc. v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch LLC, No. 4:07CV1516 JCH, 2007 
WL 3071827, at *8–9 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2007) (confirming an award in which an arbitrator 
awarded punitive damages, in part, because of the respondent’s destruction of documents and failure 
to create a record of information pertinent to the upcoming arbitration). 
 324. See, e.g., Kelly v. VinZant, 197 P.3d 803, 809 (Kan. 2008) (requiring a plaintiff to prove the 
following elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a false statement of material fact; 
(2) that was known to be false or was recklessly made without knowledge concerning falsity; (3) the 
representation was intentionally made for the purpose of inducing another party to act; (4) the other 
party reasonably relied and acted upon the representation made; and (5) resulting in damages); 
Flegles, Inc. v. TruServ Corp., 289 S.W.3d 544, 548–49 (Ky. 2009) (requiring a plaintiff to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that: (1) statement of material fact, (2) that was false, (3) that 
declarant knew to be false or made recklessly, (4) that declarant induced plaintiff to act upon the 
misrepresentation, (5) that plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentation, and (6) that the 
misrepresentation caused damages); Cowburn v. Leventis, 619 S.E.2d 437, 446 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) 
(requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove fraud). 
 325. Worth noting is the fact that arbitration is a non-public proceeding that may or may not be 
transcribed or recorded.  The amount and type of record in an arbitration might change from case to 
case, depending on the amount at stake and the financial resources of the parties involved.  Proving 
fraud on the basis of an incomplete record may be difficult, logistically, to do.  An additional 
constraint on the process could be issues of confidentiality, and whether the parties are even at 
liberty to discuss what happened at the arbitration. 
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award can be vacated.326  Stated another way, plaintiffs in a civil action 
for fraud seek affirmative damages from the other party.  The movants 
seeking vacatur of an arbitration award are not seeking to impose 
damages on the non-movant at all—they only seek to vacate an award 
rendered against them.327  In other words, the policy behind the 
heightened burden of proof does not serve the same function in the 
context of a motion to vacate an arbitration award as it traditionally does 
with respect to an affirmative claim for fraud. 
Given the limitations on judicial review,328 opening up the avenue of 
potential criminal liability would help make the arbitral process fairer 
and redress wrongs that may otherwise go without redress.  Extending 
the criminal laws of perjury and tampering to the arbitral forum would 
provide a needed avenue to correct misconduct in the arbitral forum, as 
well as provide the parties with a redress that they likely thought already 
existed.329 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Current perjury and tampering law does not adequately cover the 
arbitral forum.  Almost none of the tampering laws explicitly apply to 
arbitration, and the perjury laws that could apply to arbitration might 
only apply through creative lawyering.  While attorney ethics rules apply 
to arbitration, the criminal law has lagged behind with respect to 
applicability in ADR forums—particularly arbitration.  This Article 
recommends amending the definition of “official proceeding” to include 
the arbitral forum.  This simple legislative change would then apply the 
perjury, witness tampering, and evidence tampering statutes to the 
                                                          
 326. See Lafarge Confeils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1293, 
1339 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the standard to vacate an arbitration award for fraud). 
 327. To be sure, some financial repercussion will result if an award is vacated.  Typically, the 
movant seeks to vacate in order to not pay money that is awarded to the non-movant.  The movant in 
this action typically seeks not to get money but to prevent paying out money. 
 328. Note, too, that parties are not free to contract for a more expansive review under the 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 329. Arbitration participants will have to make a careful decision about when they allege this 
type of misconduct.  Parties who are aware of the misconduct at the time of the hearing may have an 
obligation to bring the conduct to the attention of the arbitrator.  A penalty for failure to do so may 
be a waiver of that defense.  If the defense is brought in arbitration and then later asserted in 
litigation, however, then the party later asserting the defense may be estopped from bringing up the 
defense at that time.  Further, to the extent that an arbitrator actually decides the issue, the 
arbitrator’s finding will be subject to the limited grounds for review under the FAA or the state law 
counterpart. 
BLANKLEY FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:28 AM 
2012] TAMING THE WILD WEST OF ARBITRATION ETHICS 983 
arbitral forum.  In other words, a simple change to the definitions section 
would, in one fell swoop, cause three or more statutes to apply to the 
arbitral forum. 
Sound policy underlies this recommendation.  First, the perjury and 
tampering laws are outdated and do not consider the changing nature of 
arbitration—especially the changing nature of the types of claims 
commonly considered by arbitrators today.  Second, arbitration is often 
considered a quasi-judicial forum.  As such, the protections against 
perjury and tampering afforded to other quasi-judicial forums should 
apply to the arbitral forum.  Third, courts now routinely extend absolute 
immunity to arbitration participants.330  This immunity makes arbitration 
participants immune from civil claims—such as defamation.  Unless the 
perjury and tampering laws apply, arbitration will become a forum in 
which participants are ultimately immunized from both civil and criminal 
repercussions for misbehavior in the arbitral forum.  Fourth, the 
marketplace, to date, has not regulated arbitration participant conduct.  
Extending the criminal law to the arbitral forum will fill a gap that the 
marketplace has left open.  Finally, the limited judicial review available 
to arbitration parties supports the extension of the criminal law to the 
arbitral forum.  For all of these reasons, a simple legislative change 
would help legitimatize arbitration as a fair forum and give participants 
protections against misbehavior that they might have already thought 
they had. 
                                                          
 330. See supra Part III.C.4. 
